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1 Introduction
The standard framework used for monetary policy analysis for the last decade in academic research, especially
at central banks, the so-called New Keynesian model, is one where various nominal rigidities are central.
The framework prescribes near-zero in
ation as a long-run goal. This policy prescription arises from the
most stripped-down version of the framework, where capital is absent and the only friction is that rms
face a cost for adjusting nominal prices, and it holds true in much more complicated environments. A large
fraction of models within this framework adopt a cashless perspective under which the motive that generates
money demand is not made explicit. The prevalent view is that the explicit modeling of money demand does
not alter the welfare prescriptions of New Keynesian models. Only a handful of previous studies carefully
consider frictions that generate money demand alongside nominal rigidities when studying optimal monetary
policy. We are contributing to this literature by developing a new model in which demand for money arises
because currency facilitates bilateral exchange in decentralized markets and nominal rigidities are present
in the centralized markets. We estimate dierent versions of our model based on aggregate U.S. data and
evaluate its t through comparisons with two reference models. Our estimates imply that negative target
in
ation rates in the range of  2% to  1% are preferable to a zero in
ation target.
Our contributions are threefold. First, we develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model that bridges the gap between the search-based monetary theory initiated by Kiyotaki and Wright
(1989) and the literature on estimable New Keynesian DSGE models laid out in the textbook by Woodford
(2003). Contrary to popular belief, it is fairly straightforward to combine interesting elements of the monetary
micro foundations literature with New Keynesian models and create empirical models that can be confronted
with the data and used to study important substantive questions. In our model, following the basic structure
of Lagos and Wright (2005, henceforth LW) and Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2008, henceforth AWW), in
every period economic activity takes place in two markets. In a decentralized market (DM), households
engage in bilateral trade, with a fraction of households producing and a fraction of households consuming.
The terms of trade in the bilateral exchange are either determined by bargaining (B) or Walrasian price
taking (PT). The centralized market (CM) resembles a standard DSGE model with admittedly reduced-
form nominal rigidities, where production is carried out by rms. Physical capital is a factor of production
in both markets. Demand for money arises because the particular frictions in the decentralized markets
necessitate the facilitation of transactions by a medium of exchange. We represent monetary policy by an
interest rate feedback rule, and introduce stochastic disturbances to technology, preferences, government
spending, and monetary policy to make the model amenable to econometric estimation methods. While the
structure of our model to a large extent resembles that of a canonical New Keynesian model with capital, the
presence of the decentralized market provides a micro-founded motive for holding money and creates a non-
separability between consumption and the value of real money balances. Most important for the subsequent2
policy analysis, our model incorporates two key channels through which in
ation can aect welfare. First,
non-zero in
ation rates lead to relative price distortions and inecient use of intermediate goods because it is
costly for rms to adjust nominal prices. We label this channel the New Keynesian channel. Second, non-zero
nominal interest rates constitute a tax on money holdings and hence depress activity in the decentralized
market. We label this channel the Friedman channel.
The second contribution is the estimation and evaluation of our proposed model, using post-war U.S.
data on output, in
ation, interest rates, and inverse M1 velocity. While most of the work on search-based
monetary models has been theoretical, we use the Bayesian techniques surveyed in An and Schorfheide
(2007) to conduct a full-
edged econometric analysis. In particular, we obtain posterior distributions for the
parameters that control the strength of the New Keynesian and the Friedman channels. A novel feature of
our estimation is that we construct a measure of the target in
ation rate from low frequency dynamics of
in
ation as well as in
ation expectations and then use this series along with output, in
ation, interest rates,
and velocity to estimate the DSGE model. To assess the t of the search-based DSGE model we also estimate
a vector autoregression (VAR) and a standard New Keynesian model in which real money balances enter
the households' utility function (MIU) in a separable fashion and conduct a detailed comparison. Under the
assumption that agents forecast the target in
ation rate with a random walk model, we are able to identify
impulse responses to a target in
ation rate shock in the DSGE models as well as the VAR. Responses to
this shock are informative for the subsequent policy analysis in which we will examine the eect of target
in
ation changes on welfare. An impulse response function comparison shows that the Bayesian estimates of
dierent versions of the DSGE models only capture the small short-run elasticity of velocity with respect to
interest rates, but not the larger long-run elasticity. In turn, we generate a second set of loss-function based
estimates, which reproduce the long-run (but not the short-run) interest rate elasticity of money demand.
The third contribution of the paper is the policy analysis where we examine steady state welfare eects
of changes in the target in
ation rate. In particular, we compute measures of welfare gain of changing the
target in
ation from our end-of-sample value of 2:5% to a new value  . Since both the New Keynesian and
the Friedman channels \agree" that positive target in
ation rates are undesirable, we focus on the range
of   2 [ 2:5%; 0%], where 2:5% corresponds to the real rate in our model. At   =  2:5% the nominal
interest rate is zero, which is the celebrated \Friedman rule."
The strength of the New Keynesian channel is determined by the probability with which rms are able
to re-optimize their prices { we use a Calvo (1983) style nominal rigidity in the centralized market { and
the degree to which non-optimizing rms index their past price to lagged in
ation. The Friedman channel
is to a large extent controlled by the probability with which households engage in bilateral exchange in the
decentralized market, which in turn determines the semi-interest elasticity of money demand. Moreover, as
emphasized in AWW, determining the terms of trade in the DM by bargaining creates two hold-up problems3
that amplify the welfare costs of in
ation. With posterior draws of the DSGE model parameters in hand,
we ask the following question. Given  , what is the probability that the regret { dened as the dierence
of welfare gain between the target in
ation rate that is optimal for a particular parameter draw and  
{ is small. We nd that a small regret is attained for most versions of our search-based model for target
in
ation rates of  1% or less, which contrasts with the policy recommendation derived from a cashless New
Keynesian model.
Our paper is related to several strands of the literature in monetary economics and the estimation of
DSGE models. While the literature on estimated DSGE models with New Keynesian features is large { see
Schorfheide (2009) for an extensive survey { only very few papers use a measure of money as observable
and hence implicitly or explicitly estimate a DSGE model-implied money demand function: Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), Andres, Lopez-Salido, and Nelson (2004, 2007), Ireland (2004), Bouakez,
Cardia, and Ruge-Murcia (2005, 2009), Christensen and Dib (2008), Guerron-Quintana (2008, 2009). Most
of these authors introduce money through an MIU specication that captures the value of transaction services
derived from money holdings in a reduced-form manner. Guerron-Quintana (2008, 2009) emphasizes the
distinction between short- and long-run interest rate elasticities of money demand and introduces short-run
costs of adjusting money balances into his MIU model. He reports estimates of a short-run elasticity of
about one and a long-run elasticity of approximately 13. In our search-based model (as in a standard MIU
model), short- and long-run elasticities are tightly linked and there is no free parameter to disentangle the
two. Hence, we oer two types of estimates: a likelihood-based estimate that captures short-run dynamics
in the data and a loss-function based estimate that is designed to match the long-run elasticity.
The search-theoretic literature for the most part has only recently started conducting quantitative ex-
ercises. Our paper is the rst in applying formal estimation methods to a model based the Lagos and
Wright (2005) model. Most of the policy analysis in the search-theoretic literature focuses on the optimal
long-run monetary policy. In general, for example as in LW and AWW, the Friedman rule is found to be
the optimal policy unless the model features some other frictions: some examples are endogenous partic-
ipation (Rocheteau and Wright, 2005), credit rationing by banks (Berentsen, Camera and Waller, 2007)
or government-nancing (Aruoba and Chugh, 2007, 2008). The New Keynesian channel and its potential
in
uence on monetary policy has not been analyzed in this class of models before.
There is a large literature on monetary policy analysis in New Keynesian models. Much of the New
Keynesian literature, as summarized in Woodford (2003), focuses on stabilization policies, assuming the
absence of steady state distortions. For example, Levin, Onatski, Williams, and Williams (2006) analyze
policy implications of an estimated medium-scale DSGE model under parameter uncertainty. There are also
some papers that focus on the long-run policy, but for the most part, they abstract from monetary frictions.
For example, Goodfriend and King (1997) is one of the rst papers to argue that in the absence of monetary4
frictions, the optimal long-run policy is price stability. Examples of the very few papers that consider both
of these frictions simultaneously are Guerron-Quintana (2008), King and Wolman (1996), Khan, King, and
Wolman (2003) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007). Guerron-Quintana (2008) with his estimated MIU
model focuses on the steady state welfare eects of reducing in
ation from 12% to 2%, accounting for the
transition from high to low in
ation. The remaining papers analyze the trade-o between the New Keynesian
and the Friedman channel and this is also our focus in this paper. King and Wolman (1996) show that once
monetary frictions that generate money demand, shopping-time in their case, are added to the most stripped-
down New Keynesian model, the Friedman rule is approximately optimal. Khan, King, and Wolman (2003)
use a dierent framework from Calvo-type price stickiness { one where the probability of a price change for
a rm depends on the time since last change { and the optimal long-run in
ation target in their benchmark
calibration is  0:75%. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) show that in a medium-scale New Keynesian model,
one with more frictions than ours, and with a transaction cost of consumption to motivate money demand,
the optimal policy is a long-run in
ation target of  0:5%, but it is very sensitive to changing the degree of
price stickiness.
The size of the New Keynesian distortion in a Calvo framework depends crucially on assumptions about
the prices set by rms that are unable to re-optimize. In our model a fraction  of these rms update
their prices by lagged in
ation, whereas a fraction 1    update them according to some static multiplier
. In many estimated DSGE models, e.g., Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007), Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez
(2005), Levin, Onatski, Williams, and Williams (2006), Justiniano and Primiceri (2008), it is assumed that
 equals the steady state in
ation rate, which essentially eliminates the New Keynesian distortion from
long-run considerations.1 In our analysis we will set  = 1, which preserves the steady state eects of
the New Keynesian distortion provided that  < 1. The benchmark calibration in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2007) features no dynamic indexation, that is,  = 0, and uses  = 0:8. The calibration in Khan, King and
Wolman (2003) resembles, but is not equivalent to, a parametrization of our model with  = 0:8 and  = 0.
As such, it seems that these two papers are similarly calibrated and they both nd a small level of de
ation
to be optimal.
By and large, the target in
ation prescriptions obtained from our search-based DSGE model, while
obtained under very dierent assumptions about the demand for money, are consistent with this earlier
work which gets a range of results between the Friedman rule and full price stability. We dier from the
literature above in two aspects. First, we discipline our analysis by making fairly standard choices about
utility and production functions dened over consumption goods, instead of choosing arguably arbitrary
functional forms for the utility derived from real money balances or the cost of transactions. Second, we
identify the parameters that determine the strength of various channels that have con
icting long-run policy
1The sensitivity of policy analysis to assumptions about  has recently been emphasized by Ascari and Ropele (2007).5
implications within our model, in an internally consistent way, as opposed to, for example, independently
calibrating these parameters. Moreover, we are easily able to account for parameter uncertainty in the policy
analysis using our Bayesian framework.
There are two important caveats to our policy analysis. First, we abstract from aggregate uncertainty in
the policy analysis and the eects of a potentially binding zero lower bound on policy analysis. The analysis
in Billi (2008) in the context of a cash-less New Keynesian model without capital suggests that accounting
for the zero-lower bound in a stochastic environment might lead to a slightly larger optimal target in
ation
rate than found in this paper. Second, we focus on the policy trade-os between two particular channels
and do not include some of the other channels in our analysis such as downward rigidity of nominal wages
that has been previously considered in the literature. Our results should be interpreted to say that when
one only considers these two channels the optimal policy is to have a long-run in
ation target of less than
 1%.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We provide a detailed derivation and discussion of
the search-based DSGE model in Section 2. The Bayesian estimation results are presented in Section 3 and
the welfare analysis is summarized in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes. Detailed derivations as well as
additional estimation results are provided in an appendix that is available electronically.
2 The Model
The model is an extension of the two-sector model developed in LW. In every period, there is economic
activity in two markets, which we label as the decentralized (DM) and the centralized market (CM). In the
DM, households engage in decentralized bilateral trade in which one party produces and the other consumes.
The CM resembles a standard macro model where production is carried out by rms and transactions take
place in centralized labor and goods markets. We extend the LW model along two dimensions. First, we
include physical capital as a factor of production in the centralized as well as the decentralized market,
following AWW. The only deviation we have from AWW in this regard is that we introduce an adjustment
cost for investment to improve the empirical t. Second, to generate price stickiness we replace the perfectly
competitive CM rms by monopolistically competitive rms that are constrained in their ability to change
nominal prices. The centralized market is essentially identical to the goods market in a standard New
Keynesian DSGE model (see Woodford, 2003) with a Calvo (1983) friction.
In turn we will describe the households' decision problems in both the centralized and the decentralized
market (Section 2.1) and the rms' problem in the centralized market (Section 2.2). We then characterize the
behavior of scal policy (Section 2.3), derive an aggregate resource constraint (Section 2.4) and characterize
monetary policy (Section 2.5). Our model economy is subject to aggregate disturbances as we show in6
Section 2.6. A summary of all of the equilibrium conditions and more details for some of the derivations are
provided in the Appendix.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of ex-ante identical households in the economy. In every period, households rst
trade in the DM. According to an idiosyncratic taste shock that is realized at the beginning of the period,
households become buyers with probability , sellers with probability , or non-participants with probability
1   2. These shocks are independent across time and across households. When a household receives the
shock that makes it a buyer, it wants to consume in the DM and cannot produce. Similarly, a seller does not
wish to consume, but is able to produce for another household. The taste shocks create a double-coincidence
problem where frictionless barter cannot occur.2 All households are anonymous in this market which means
their possible trading partners cannot identify them and therefore will not accept any IOUs. Kiyotaki and
Wright (1989) showed that a double-coincidence problem, of the type created by the taste shocks and the
anonymity of households, will make money \essential" in the decentralized market, since trade can only
happen with a quid pro quo. In a monetary equilibrium, the buyer uses money to purchase the good from
the seller.3 Thus, the desire to consume in the DM generates a demand for money in our model. Given
that there are equal measures of buyers and sellers, we assume there is an ecient matching technology that
matches exactly one buyer with one seller. The terms of trade in such a match are determined via one of
two alternative schemes: generalized Nash bargaining or price-taking.
Once the households leave the DM, they proceed to the CM where neither of the two frictions that create
a role for money in the DM is present: the households are identical in their preferences and abilities and they
are not anonymous. This means that there is no role for a medium of exchange in the CM. Using labor and
capital income, the households acquire the nal goods produced in the CM and use them for consumption
and to accumulate capital. Households also adjust their asset holdings. We assume that households have
access to a set of claims contingent on all possible realizations of the aggregate states. To characterize the
household's behavior in this economy, we start from the problem of the household in the CM, followed by
the DM problem.
2.1.1 Household Activity in the Centralized Market
The households take as given the aggregate price level in the CM, Pt, the gross nominal interest rate Rt on
one-period bonds, the wage Wt, the rental rate of capital, Rk
t, and the set of aggregate shocks St, along with
2AWW show that a search-based setup in which households meet at random leads to the same mathematical construct.
3As with any deep model of money, there is a non-monetary equilibrium in this model that is dominated by the monetary
equilibrium in terms of welfare. We focus on the monetary equilibrium.7
their laws of motion. We use V CM
t (^ mt;kt;it 1;bt;St) and V DM
t (mt;kt;it 1;bt;St) to denote the period t
value functions in the CM and DM, where ^ mt is the money balance of a household entering the CM, kt is its
capital stock, it 1 is lagged investment, and bt denotes its bond holdings. The CM problem takes the form4
V CM
t (^ mt;kt;it 1;bt;St) = max
xt;ht;mt+1;it;kt+1;bt+1





Ptxt + Ptit + bt+1 + mt+1  PtWtht + PtRk
tkt + t + Rt 1bt + ^ mt   Tt + 
t (1)








Here U(xt) is the instantaneous utility from consuming xt units of the nal good, A is the disutility of one unit
of labor, ht is hours worked, Tt is a nominal lump-sum tax, t denotes the total prots the household receives
from intermediate good producers, and 
t is the household's net cash-in-
ow from trading state-contingent
securities. The assumption of quasi-linear preferences is crucial and leads to a degenerate distribution of
asset holdings at the end of each period.5
Equation (2) determines the capital accumulation. The adjustment cost function S(:) satises properties
S(1) = 0, S0(1) = 0 and S00(1) > 0. We adopt the timing convention that kt+1 and mt+1 denote capital and
money holdings at the end of period t and do not depend on period t+1 shocks. Derivations in the appendix
show that since the individual state variables (^ mt;kt;it 1;bt) do not appear in the household's optimality
conditions, the household's decisions in the CM do not depend on its state variables. More specically, for
any distribution of assets (^ mt;kt;bt) across agents entering the CM, the distribution of (mt+1;kt+1;bt+1)
is degenerate.6 Second, we show that V CM
t (:) is linear in ^ mt which will be important in the DM problem
below. Finally, the Lagrange multiplier associated with the households' nominal budget constraint (1) is
U0(xt)=Pt. Under the assumption that households have access to a set of claims contingent on all possible







which the rms use to discount future prots.
4We could index households with j, but we will see that the index will drop out of most of these variables due to quasi-linearity
of preferences since in equilibrium households will make the same choice of consumption, money demand, and investment. So,
we drop this index from the outset.
5This assumption can be motivated, as is done in the RBC model of Hansen (1985), by the indivisible labor setup of
Rogerson (1988). See Rocheteau et al. (2008a) and Rocheteau et al. (2008b) for details.
6This result requires a small qualication for bond holdings. See the appendix.8
2.1.2 Household Activity in the Decentralized Market
The value of starting the DM for a household whose taste shock has not been realized yet is given by
V DM
t (mt;kt;it 1;bt;St) = V b
t (mt;kt;it 1;bt;St) + V s
t (mt;kt;it 1;bt;St) (4)
+(1   2)V CM
t (mt;kt;it 1;bt;St);
where the values of being a buyer and a seller are
V b
t (mt;kt;it 1;bt;St) = tu(qb








t (mt;kt;it 1;bt;St) =  c(qs
t;kt;Zt) + V CM
t (mt + ds
t;kt;it 1;bt;St): (6)
A household that consumes qt units of the consumption good in the DM receives utility tu(qt). The
disturbance t is a preference shock for goods produced in the DM. Since money is essential to purchase
DM goods, t can also be interpreted as a money demand shock. A seller household in the DM experiences
disutility  et, where et denotes the eort the household exerts to produce qt units of the DM good according
to the technology qt = Ztf(et;kt). The total factor productivity process Zt is assumed to be exogenous
and common across DM and CM. We invert the production function to express the level of eort as et =




t) denote output and money exchanged when
buying (selling). The terms of trade are determined via bilateral generalized Nash bargaining, which is one of
the most common schemes in the search literature, or price taking, which was rst considered by Rocheteau
and Wright (2005). Apart from the mechanics, an important dierence between these two schemes is the
absence of holdup problems in the price-taking version.
Bargaining. Exploiting the linearity of the CM value function, and using threat points that have the agents












s.t. d  mb;
where  is the bargaining power of the buyer. The rst term captures the buyer's surplus and the second
term is the seller's surplus. We dropped the time subscripts since the bargaining problem is static. Using
the insights of LW and AWW, in any monetary equilibrium d = mb, that is the buyer spends all his money
in exchange for some q that the seller produces using his capital and eort. Inserting d = mb and taking the







where g(:) is a function of various primitive functions. The quantity q of goods produced can be obtained








where cq (ck) denotes the partial derivative of the cost function c(qt;kt;Zt) with respect to its rst (second)
argument, and  
(:) captures a seller's marginal return of capital in the DM. In particular, having more
capital will reduce the seller's cost for a given quantity produced, which is captured by the ck term. However,
due to the non-competitive nature of the DM under this pricing scheme, having more capital for the seller
will also aect the terms of trade by increasing the output produced and this will increase his cost. This
second term is the source of one of the holdup problems.
Price-Taking. With price taking, the DM value function has the same form as (4), but now
V b
t (mt;kt;it 1;bt;St) = max
q

tu(q) + V CM
t (mt   ~ pq;kt;it 1;bt;St)
	
s.t. ~ pq  m (9)
V s




t;kt;Zt) + V CM
t (mt + ~ pq;kt;it 1;bt;St)
	
; (10)
where ~ p is the DM price level taken as given by the household and the constraint in the buyer's problem
ensures the quid pro quo nature of trade in the DM. Market clearing guarantees that buyers and sellers
choose the same q and buyers will choose to spend all of their money so that q = mb=~ p will hold. From the







which can be solved for the quantity produced q as a function of mb, ks, and Z.
2.1.3 Households' Optimality Conditions






t=0 and exogenous aggregate states fZt;tg
1
t=0 ; the household solves
for fqt;xt;mt+1;kt+1;it;bt+1;tg
1















































































+ (1   )

(18)10
where we used t+1  Pt+1=Pt. The rst four equations above are entirely standard in a DSGE model with
an investment adjustment cost and quasi-linear preferences. Equation (12) is a labor supply equation that
relates the wage to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. Equation (13) is the
Euler equation for bond holdings. Equation (14) describes the evolution of the shadow price of installed
capital, t, and (15) is the capital accumulation equation.
Equations (16), (17) and (18) re
ect the presence of the decentralized market. Equation (16) is the
Euler equation for capital stock holdings. The return to capital has two components: the return from renting
capital to intermediate good producing rms in the centralized market, Rk
t, net of capital depreciation, and
the return to capital when producing in the decentralized market. In the absence of the latter, (16) would
be the standard intertemporal Euler equation for capital. The additional term captures the marginal utility
of using capital in the DM as a seller which depends on the 
(:) function dened in (8). Equation (17)
determines the output produced in the DM, given the pre-determined money balances of the buyer and
capital holdings of the seller, among other things.
Finally, (18) is the Euler equation for holding money where the term in square brackets re
ects the
additional consumption provided in the DM by holding money. In particular, bringing in one more unit of
money to the DM of t + 1 will change the price that the buyer is facing by a fraction U0(:)=gq(:) due to the
non-competitive nature of pricing and this will result in increased utility given by the rst part of this term
which is reached with probability . With probability 1   , the extra money is not used in the DM and
can be used for consumption in the CM of t + 1. Note that combining (12), (17) and (18) we obtain the












+ (1   )

: (19)
The two holdup problems discussed in detail in AWW are also present in the bargaining version of
our model. In a nutshell, for an interior value of , the buyer and the seller both receive a part of the
surplus created by their match. However, assuming R > 1, both have made a costly and irreversible ex-ante
investment decision in the previous period: the buyer brought in money and the seller brought in capital.
The ex-post split of the surplus creates a double holdup problem. The money-demand holdup problem can
be eliminated if  = 1, i.e., when the buyer gets all of the surplus but there is no  that can eliminate both
problems.7 These holdup problems, which are intrinsically linked to the monetary nature of exchange in the
DM, will create an extra layer of ineciency in our policy analysis.
7See AWW and Aruoba, Rocheteau and Waller (2007) for further details.11




























+ (1   )

(22)
The changes in (21) and (22) re
ect the competitive 
avor of pricing in the DM. Increasing the capital stock
now simply increases utility by  ck(:), which is the reduction in the DM cost when the household is a
seller. The terms of trade are not aected and the extra terms in (8) do not appear.
The set of equations above determines the path of money balances, given m0, which is identical across
all households assuming an interior solution. As all households start period t with the same money balances,
mt = Mt where Mt is the aggregate money stock, the buyers in the DM enter the CM with ^ m = 0, the
sellers with ^ m = 2M while the remaining 1   2 households carry ^ m = M. Looking at (1), this means that
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where Ht is aggregate hours which we dene below. This shows that buyers in the DM work more than
others since they have to make up for the money they have spent and sellers work less than others. We only
care about total hours Ht in equilibrium and will not track individual ht, or its dispersion.
2.2 Firms in the Centralized Market
The setup of the centralized market resembles that of a New Keynesian DSGE model. Production is carried
out by two types of rms in the CM: nal good producers combine dierentiated intermediate goods. In-
termediate goods producing rms hire labor and capital services from the households to produce the inputs
for the nal good producers. To introduce nominal rigidity we follow Calvo (1983) by assuming that only a
constant fraction of the intermediate goods producers is able to re-optimize prices.
2.2.1 Final Good Producers









with elasticity of substitution (1 + )=. We constrain  2 [0;1). The nal good producers buy the
intermediate goods on the market, package them into Yt units of the composite good, and resell them to
consumers. These rms maximize prots in a perfectly competitive environment taking Pt(i) as given, which


















2.2.2 Intermediate Goods Producers and In
ation Dynamics






The technology shock Zt is identical to the one that appears in the DM production function. Firm i's prot
is given by:
t(i) = Pt(i)Yt(i)   PtWtHt(i)   PtRk
tKt(i): (28)
All rms take factor prices Wt and Rk
t, as well as the prices of the other rms and the aggregate price level
as given. The cost-minimizing choice of factor inputs leads to the following expression for marginal costs






Following Calvo (1983), we assume that rms are only able with probability 1    to re-optimize their
price in the current period. Firms that are not allowed to choose Pt(i) optimally, update their price according
to the geometric weighted average of the xed rate  and of last period's in
ation t 1 with weights 1  
and , respectively. In Calvo's original setup  = 1 and  = 0. In our empirical analysis we x  = 1 and
treat the degree of dynamic indexation, , as a parameter to be estimated. It is useful to dene the price









adopting the convention that 
adj
tjt = 1. Firms that are unable to re-optimize their prices simply satisfy the
demand for their product according to (25).
For those rms that are allowed to re-optimize prices, the problem is to choose a price level Po
t (i) that


































t+sjt is the time t value of a dollar in period t+s for the consumers. Here we are considering only
the symmetric equilibrium in which all rms that can re-adjust prices will choose the same Po
t (i).
The solution of (30) leads to a dynamic relationship between the optimal price po
t = Po
t =Pt and marginal













ation to marginal costs and generates the so-called New Keynesian Phillips curve.
2.3 Government Spending and Fiscal Policy
In period t; the government in this model collects a nominal lump-sum tax Tt; spends Gt on goods from the
centralized market, issues one-period nominal bonds Bt+1 that pay Rt gross interest tomorrow and supplies
the money to maintain the interest rate rule. It satises the following budget constraint every period
PtGt + Rt 1Bt + Mt = Tt + Bt+1 + Mt+1: (32)
We assume that government spending Gt evolves exogenously and will provide further details below.
2.4 Aggregate Resource Constraint and National Accounting
We begin by adding the households' CM budget constraints and the government budget constraint to obtain
PtXt + PtIt + PtGt = PtWtHt + PtRk
tKt + t: (33)









= PtYt   PtWtHt   PtRk
tKt:
The second equality follows from the zero prot conditions for the nal goods producers. Combining the
expression for prots with (33) we obtain
Xt + It + Gt = Yt; (34)14
which is the resource constraint in the CM. Since there is no savings in the DM (and goods are perishable),
there is a trivial resource constraint that sets consumption equal to output.
The relationship between the total output of the intermediate goods producers,  Yt, and the aggregate
labor and capital inputs in the CM is given by









The second equality follows from the fact that the optimal capital labor ratio Kt(i)=Ht(i) only depends on

































Unless Pt(i) = Pt for all rms, Dt will be greater than unity, which in turn implies the economy will produce
inside its production possibilities frontier.
We now turn to the aggregation of CM and DM output. Real output in the CM is given by Yt and Pt is
the price (in terms of money) of the CM nal good. Real and nominal output in the DM are given by qt
and Mt, respectively. Hence, we can dene the price level and in
ation in the DM as
PDM




Using the nal good produced in the CM as numeraire, we can express total output in the model economy
as
Yt = Yt + Mt=t; (38)
where Mt  Mt=Pt 1 is the real money stock in terms of CM output. To take our model to the data
we now construct a GDP de
ator and a measure of real GDP that is consistent with this GDP de
ator.
Following NIPA conventions, we use a Fisher price index. However, to simplify the analysis we replace
time-varying nominal shares by steady state shares. The DM share of nominal output in the steady state is













we verify in the appendix that up to a rst-order approximation changes in real GDP evolve according to
lnYGDP
t = (1   s)lnYt + slnqt: (41)15
2.5 Monetary Policy
Following authors like Sargent (1999) and Lucas (2000) we assume that low frequency movements of in
ation,
such as the rise of in
ation in the 1970s and the subsequent disin
ation episode in the early 1980s, can be
attributed to monetary policy changes. Unlike in the learning models considered by Sargent, Williams, and
Zha (2006) or Primiceri (2006), our DSGE models oer no explanation why monetary policy shifts occur
over time. We simply assume that the target in
ation rate ;t is time-varying. The central bank supplies
money to control the nominal interest rate. Following the setup in Schorfheide (2005), we assume that it
systematically reacts to in


















where r is the steady state real interest rate, 
 is the gross steady state growth rate of the economy, and
R;t is a monetary policy shock that captures transitory deviations from the interest rate feedback rule that
are unanticipated by the public.
2.6 Aggregate Shocks
We consider ve aggregate disturbances in our model economy. Zt is the random productivity term that
aects production in both CM and DM. gt is a shock that shifts government spending according to
Gt = (1   1=gt)Yt: (43)
We assume that although government consumption goods are purchased in the centralized market, the
overall amount is a stochastic fraction of total GDP, expressed in CM prices. The money demand shock
t shifts preferences for goods produced in the DM. Finally, our model has two monetary policy shocks:
R;t is assumed to be serially uncorrelated and captures short-run shifts in monetary policy, whereas the
time-varying in
ation target ;t captures long-run policy changes. We dene
~ Zt = ln(Zt=Z); ~ t = ln(t=); ~ gt = ln(gt=g); ~ ;t = ln(;t=)
where Z, , g, and  are steady state values of the exogenous disturbances. We assume that all the
exogenous disturbances except for ~ ;t evolve according to stationary AR(1) processes
~ Zt = z ~ Zt 1 + zz;t; ~ t = ~ t 1 + 

;t; ~ gt = g~ gt 1 + gg;t
and ~ ;t evolves as a random walk
~ ;t = ~ ;t 1 + 
;t:16
The innovations are stacked in the vector  = [z;t;;t;g;t;;t;R;t] which follows a multi-variate standard
normal distribution. The law of motion for the exogenous processes completes the specication of our DSGE
model. The equilibrium conditions are summarized in the Appendix. We derive the deterministic steady state
for this model and use a log-linear approximation to its dynamics to form a state-space representation that
is used for the Bayesian estimation. We log-linearize our model around a  that corresponds to an annual
in
ation rate of 4%, which is the mean in our sample. AWW use a nonlinear solution scheme (projection
method with Chebyshev polynomials) with no shocks and nd that around a reasonable neighborhood of the
steady state the decision rules are well-approximated linearly. Aruoba and Chugh (2008) use a version of
the AWW model with shocks and report that rst- and second-order linear approximations and non-linear
approximations lead to very similar results. Accumulated evidence from estimating New Keynesian DSGE
models, see for example, An (2007), also suggests that rst-order approximations work well.
3 Empirical Analysis
We now turn to the DSGE model estimation. We use a Bayesian approach discussed in detail in An and
Schorfheide (2007). Our data set is described in Section 3.1. For reasons explained below the target in
ation
rate is treated as an observable in the estimation. The construction of this series is discussed in Section 3.2.
Functional forms are specied in Section 3.3 and a description of the prior distribution is provided in
Section 3.4. Next, parameter estimates as well as implied steady states are presented in Section 3.5 and
the implied model dynamics are analyzed via variance decompositions and impulse response functions in
Section 3.6. Finally, we assess the t of the search-based DSGE model in Section 3.7.
3.1 Data
Our empirical analysis is based on quarterly U.S. postwar data on aggregate output, in
ation, interest rates,
(inverse) velocity of money, and a measure of the central bank's target in
ation rate. Unless otherwise
noted, the data are obtained from the FRED2 database maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis. Per capita output is dened as real GDP (GDPC96) divided by civilian non-institutionalized pop-
ulation (CNP16OV). The population series is provided at a monthly frequency and converted to quarterly
frequency by simple averaging. Since the quarterly 
ow statistics reported in the National Income and
Product Accounts are annualized, we divide real GDP by 4. The model presented in Section 2 is specied
to capture stationary 
uctuations around a deterministic steady state. Hence, we take the natural log of
per capita output and extract a deterministic trend by an OLS regression over the sample period 1959:I to
2006:IV. The deviations from the linear trend are scaled by 100 to convert them into percentages.17
In
ation is dened as the log dierence of the GDP de
ator (GDPDEF) and multiplied by 400 to
obtain annualized percentages. Our measure of nominal interest rates corresponds to the federal funds rate
(FEDFUNDS). The federal funds rate is provided at monthly frequency and converted to quarterly frequency
by simple averaging. Money is incorporated as an observable by using inverse M1 velocity. We use the sweep-
adjusted M1S series provided by Cynamon, Dutkowsky and Jones (2006).8 This series is recorded at monthly
frequency without seasonal adjustments. The EVIEWS default version of the X12 lter is applied to remove
seasonal variation. The M1S series is divided by quarterly nominal output to obtain inverse velocity. Since
the choice variable Mt+1 in our model corresponds to the money balances at the end of period t, velocity
in period t is computed based on the money stock in the last month of the quarter. We take the natural
log of inverse velocity, and scale it by 100 to relate it to the log deviations from 100  ln(M=Y). Our
estimation sample ranges from 1965:I to 2005:I and we use likelihood functions conditional on data from
1964:I to 1964:IV to estimate our DSGE model and vector autoregressions (VARs).
3.2 Target In
ation and Velocity
As explained in Section 2, we assume that the target-in
ation rate ;t is time varying. One could simply
treat ;t as a latent variable in the likelihood-based estimation of the DSGE model and use the Kalman
smoother to obtain ex-post estimates of ;t based on the observations that are included in the construction
of the likelihood function. We shall deviate from this commonly used approach for the following two reasons:
(i) we will assess the time series t of the DSGE model and the propagation of unanticipated changes in the
target in
ation rate through a comparison with a VAR. To facilitate this comparison, it is helpful to treat
the target in
ation rate as observable. (ii) From the perspective of the agents ;t can be interpreted as a
long-run in
ation expectation. Hence, we will incorporate survey expectations in the construction of the ;t
series.
The rst step of our analysis is to apply a bandpass lter to the GDP de
ator in
ation rate. Since the
agents generate forecasts of future target in
ation rates with a random walk model we will use a one-sided
bandpass lter that removes cycles of a duration of less than 64 quarters. Our lter is based on the approach
by Geweke (1978) and Pierce (1980). We construct a time-domain moving average representation of the ideal
one-sided lter (truncated at 500 lags) and then replace missing lagged observations by optimal backcasts
obtained from an estimated AR(4) model. The resulting ltered in
ation series is plotted in the top left
panel of Figure 1. The panel also shows 1-year and 10-year-ahead in
ation expectations obtained from the
Survey of Professional Forecasters, maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. From 1972 to
8Since mid-1990s, banks in the U.S. regularly \swept" funds from their customers checking accounts to money market
accounts in an eort to avoid holding reserves, signicantly distorting the money measures. Since this was typically done in a
fashion invisible to the account holders, we use this measure which adjusts M1 as explained in Cynamon et al. (2006).18
1985 as well as from 1995 to 2005 these three measures of target in
ation move closely together. Only from
1990 to 1995 there is a discrepancy between the bandpass ltered series and the in
ation expectations that
exceeds 150 basis points.
To combine the three series we use a small state-space model with measurement equations
e BP
t = e ;t + 0:0251;t; e 
1y
t = e ;t + 2;t; e 
10y
t = e ;t + 3;t;
and state transitions
e ;t = e ;t 1 + ;t; 2;t = 22;t 1 + 22;t; 3;t = 33;t 1 + 33;t;
where the i;t's are iid standard normal random variables and e BP
t , e 
1y
t , and e 
10y
t are bandpass ltered
in
ation, 1-year-ahead forecasts, and 10-year-ahead forecasts, respectively. We xed the innovation standard
deviation for e BP
t to implicitly control the weight on the bandpass ltered series and estimated the remaining
parameters. The ltered target in
ation series e ;t is displayed in the top right panel of Figure 1 together
with the GDP de
ator in
ation. If one regresses the ltered series e ;t on the three observed measures, the
coecients are 0.57 (e BP
t ), 0.22 (e 
1y
t ), and 0.23 (e 
10y
t ). Moreover, the dynamics of e ;t are well approximated
by the random walk that the DSGE model agents use to forecast the target in
ation rate.
Finally, the bottom panel of Figure 1 overlays the federal funds rate and M1 inverse velocity. According
to our theoretical framework, the rise and fall of the nominal interest rate is to a large extent generated
by exogenously changing preferences of monetary policy makers, as re
ected in ;t. The postwar U.S.
data exhibit a strong negative correlation between inverse velocity and nominal interest rates that at least
qualitatively resembles a money-demand relationship.
3.3 Functional Forms
We use the following functional forms in our estimation:
u(q) = ln(q + )   ln(); U (x) = B ln(x); f (e;k) = e1 k;
where  is set equal to 1E-4 to make sure qt = 0 can be handled.9 The parameter B determines the relative
weight of the utility from consuming the CM and DM goods. We use a natural logarithm for both utility
functions and use the same Cobb-Douglas production function as the function used by the intermediate good
producers in the CM as these are necessary conditions for balanced-growth in this model, as Waller (2009)




9In the bargaining problem in the DM, the threat point of a buyer is having q = 0 and moving on to the next CM. With
this functional form u(0) = 0 and this threat point is well-dened.19
3.4 Restricted Parameters and Prior Distributions
One goal of our empirical analysis is to compare the propagation of shocks and the steady state welfare
implications for various specications of our model. Hence, it is desirable to normalize and restrict a subset
of the model parameters prior to estimation. A summary is provided in Table 1. The steady states of real
GDP, Y, and the DM preference shock process, , are normalized to one. The steady state log inverse
velocity is xed at the sample mean -0.38. Average inverse labor productivity in our sample is 0.03 (a worker
produces about $33 of real GDP in one hour) and we use this value to restrict H=Y. These restrictions
imply unique values for the the preference parameters A and B as well as the steady state level of technology
Z.
We log-linearize our DSGE model around the average in
ation rate in our sample, which is approximately
4%. We let rA be equal to the dierence of the average federal funds rate and the average in
ation rate
between 1965 and 2005 and set  = 1=(1 + rA=400). We set g = 1:2, which is computed from the average
ratio of government consumption plus investment and GDP. We x the depreciation rate  at 0.014. This
value is obtained as the average ratio of xed asset depreciation and the stock of xed assets between 1959
and 2005.10
It is well known that the central bank's reaction to in
ation deviations,  1, is dicult to identify. Since
the primary focus of the paper is not to estimate monetary policy rules we set  1 = 1:7. This value is taken
from Schorfheide (2005), who estimated a model with a regime-switching target in
ation rate over a similar
time period. Finally, we let F = 0 (no xed costs) and  = 1, meaning that there is no static indexation
for the rms that cannot change their prices.
Suppose we stack the remaining DSGE model parameters in the vector # with elements #i, i = 1;:::;k.





The marginal densities pi(#i) capture prior information for individual parameters and are summarized in
the rst four columns of Table 2. Following Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008), the function f(#) is used to
incorporate beliefs about steady states that are a function of multiple parameters.
The two household-related parameters are related to the search and matching frictions that generate a
role for money demand. We guide our priors for these parameters using the calibration in AWW. Specically,
, the probability of a single coincidence in the DM, is bounded between zero and 0.5 and has a fairly wide
prior around 0.2. As we demonstrate further below, this parameter aects the steady state velocity and the
10We use NIPA-FAT11 (current cost net stock) and NIPA-FAT13 (current cost depreciation) for xed assets and consumer
durables).20
responsiveness of money demand to changes in the interest rate. In the bargaining version of our model
the parameter  measures the bargaining power of the buyer and aects the mark-up in the decentralized
market. The prior for the bargaining power is uniform over its range of [0;1].
Turning to the rms, we use a uniform prior on the indexation parameter . As we discuss further
below and as Schorfheide (2009) argues, previous studies xed or estimated  to be a wide range of numbers,
including zero (no dynamic indexation) and one (full dynamic indexation). Our prior for  is broadly
consistent with micro-evidence on the frequency of price changes. The parameter  corresponds to the
markup in the centralized market and is centered at 15%. The prior distributions for g, z, and  re
ect
the belief that the government spending (demand) disturbance, the technology shock, and the DM preference
shock are fairly persistent. The priors for the shock standard deviations were loosely chosen such that the
implied distribution of the variability of the endogenous variables is broadly in line with the variability of
the observed series over a pre-sample from 1959 to 1964.
The function f(#) summarizes beliefs about the investment-output (I=Y) ratio, the labor share (lsh),

















Thus, f(#) down-weighs the overall prior density at parameter combinations for which the investment output
ratio, the labor share, and the mark-ups deviate from 0.16, 0.60, and 0.15, respectively. For the price-taking
version of the search-based DSGE model the mark-up in the decentralized market is zero and we drop the
corresponding term from the function f(#).
3.5 Parameter and Steady State Estimates
The posterior distribution is obtained by combining the prior distribution described in the previous subsection
with the likelihood function for output, in
ation, interest rates, inverse velocity, and the target in
ation rate
derived from the state-space representations of the linearized DSGE models. We then use a random-walk
Metropolis algorithm to generate draws from the posterior distribution of the parameters. To make inference
about steady states, impulse responses, and variance decompositions, we convert the parameter draws into
the statistics of interest. Further technical details are described in An and Schorfheide (2007). Posterior
means and 90% credible intervals for the estimated DSGE model parameters are reported in Table 2. The
bargaining model is abbreviated as SBM(B) and the price-taking model as SBM(PT).
The estimated single-coincidence probability is around 0.3. We will document in Section 3.7 that this
estimate captures the fairly low short-run elasticity of money demand with respect to interest rates in the
data. The estimate of  = 0:95 in SBM(B) is strongly in
uenced by the prior distribution that favors21
parameter values consistent with a mark-up of about 15% throughout the sectors of the economy. This leads
to a DM mark-up of 17% and this along with the 14% mark-up in the CM and the DM share of 20% matches
our target of aggregate markup. To provide a comparison, in AWW,  was calibrated to be around 0.90
using a DM markup of 30% as the target.11
Turning to the rms we have a number of departures from standard parameter estimates due to both
the two-sector structure of our model and the dierences in pricing mechanisms in the two sectors. The
estimate of the CM mark-up is higher in the price taking model, because the DM mark-up is zero and we
are using a fairly tight prior that implies an economy-wide mark-up of about 15%. The capital share 
is estimated to be signicantly larger in SBM(B) than in SBM(PT). This is due to the holdup problems
in SBM(B) which, everything equal, reduces the steady state capital stock. Since we are using priors that
restrict the investment-output ratio to be approximately 16% in both models, the hold-up problem present
in the bargaining model requires a larger capital share parameter in the production function.
The estimates of the price-stickiness parameter  and the degree of indexation  are relatively high
in both models, implying an average duration between price re-optimizations in the centralized market of
about 6 quarters and a dynamic indexation of 60%-70%. In a model in which the rate of static indexation
corresponds to the steady state in







I Et[e t+1] +
(1   )(1   )
(1 + )
g MCt:
Note that we log-linearize our model around 4% annual in
ation and use  = 1, which leads to a dynamic
Phillips curve where lags of MCt appear. Nevertheless, interpreting our estimates under the restrictions
above, our coecient estimates would translate into a Phillips curve slope of 0.02 (with respect to marginal
costs) and the coecient on lagged in
ation would be about 0.42. Compared to the slope estimates surveyed
in Schorfheide (2009), which range from 1E-3 to about 4, our estimate is fairly small but not unreasonable.
Since the degree of indexation is inherently dicult to identify, the estimates of the coecient on lagged
in
ation reported in the literature are essentially uniformly distributed over the range 0 to 0.5 and are very
sensitive to auxiliary assumptions about the law of motion of exogenous shocks.
To understand why we obtain a fairly 
at Phillips curve and a large degree of dynamic indexation, note
that in a standard New Keynesian model  and  are identied from the dynamic properties of in
ation and
the correlation between in
ation and marginal cost. For example, if  = 0, then in
ation simply inherits the
persistence of the sum of discounted expected marginal costs and if  = 0, there is no Phillips-curve link
between in
ation and marginal cost 
uctuations. In our model, these parameters govern the said properties
only for CM in
ation and aggregate in
ation is a weighted average of the in
ation in the CM and the DM. We
11The steady state growth rate of GDP, which is parameterized by 
 in the interest rate feedback rule, is set equal to one
since we model deviations from the steady state.22
will document subsequently that in
ation in the DM lacks persistence and prices in the DM are essentially

exible. This means that in order to match the same aggregate properties, CM in
ation needs to be more
persistent (large ) and CM prices need to be more rigid (large ). This also means that, in the aggregate, the
average duration of a price in our model is in line with other studies that use a one-sector model. The CM
rms comprise 80% of total production, which means the probability that a given price cannot be changed
is 0:80:83 = 0:66. This implies an average duration of 8.8 months between price changes in the aggregate,
perfectly in line with other empirical studies.
Table 2 contains two parameters that have not been discussed previously: ~ 
0;A is the value of the target
in
ation process in period t = 0, measured in deviations from the log-linearization point, which is set to
4% annualized in
ation. The parameter R;2 measures the standard deviation of the monetary policy shock
R;t between 1979:I and 1982:IV, a period when interest rate feedback rules are known to t poorly. The
estimates of the parameters that describe the central bank behavior and the evolution of the exogenous
shocks are very similar across SBM(B) and SBM(PT). The estimated reaction coecient to output growth
is about 0.85 and the interest rate smoothing parameter is 0.6. The preference shock for DM goods is the
most persistent among the shocks with an autocorrelation of about 0.97.
The implied posterior distribution of the steady states of SBM(B) and SBM(PT) is reported in Table 3.
As we explained in Section 3.4, one of our goals in the estimation of our models was to have them display
similar long-run characteristics, which are in line with the U.S. postwar experience. Thus, due to our choice
of prior distribution the estimated investment-output ratio, capital-output ratio, labor share, and economy-
wide mark-up are very similar across the two model economies. The estimated share of the decentralized
market is about 20%. The economies dier, however, with respect to the implied preference parameters A
and B and the steady state level of technology Z. Agents in the price-taking economy assign a slightly larger
weight to CM consumption and the disutility from working. Moreover, the steady state level of technology
is higher in the SBM(PT) economy. The dierences in the SBM(B) and SBM(PT) parameter estimates are
due to the absence of a hold-up problem under price-taking, and the larger New Keynesian distortion due
to a lower estimate of .
3.6 Dynamics
We now explore the dynamics of our model. Variance decompositions for output, in
ation, and interest rates
are reported in Table 4. The decompositions are computed for business cycle frequencies ranging from 6 to
32 quarters per cycle. Since the decompositions for SBM(B) and SBM(PT) are very similar, we will focus
on the bargaining version. Our model was built upon the assumption that the target in
ation shock only
aects low frequency movements and hence its contribution to business cycle 
uctuations is essentially zero.23
Technology shocks cause about 30% of the output 
uctuations and the demand or government spending
shocks explain roughly 50%. Technology shocks are also the most important source of in
ation dynamics
and generate 50% of its business cycle movements. A part of this last observation is due to the Phillips curve
relationship between technology shocks (and therefore marginal costs) and in
ation in the CM and a part of
it is due to the eect of the technology shock on DM production, which in turn aects in
ation in the DM.
A key feature of the search-based models is their non-separable structure, meaning that even under an
interest-rate feedback rule, the economy is not insulated from money demand shocks. These money demand
shocks arise from time-varying taste for the goods produced in the decentralized market and explain around
5% of output 
uctuations and about 70% of the cyclical 
uctuations of real money balances. This nding
is consistent with the central bank accommodating most money demand shocks or a misspecication of our
model. While these two interpretations have dierent implications for policy, we are not able to distinguish
between the two in the context of our estimated model.
Impulse response functions to a technology shock for SBM(B) are depicted in Figure 2. A positive
technology shock decreases current and future expected marginal costs. As a result the increase in technology
on impact creates an immediate decrease in prices in the DM, which is re
ected in the response of DM/CM
relative price and DM in
ation. Due the rise in productivity, CM and DM production increase on impact.
According to the estimated monetary policy rule, the central bank responds to negative in
ation and positive
GDP growth by lowering the nominal interest rate. The drop in interest rates reduces the opportunity costs of
holding money and raises the demand for DM goods and, hence, real money balances. Recall that according
to our timing convention time t real money balances re
ect end-of-period holdings. As a result of the this
increased demand for DM goods,after period 1, DM in
ation increases as does CM in
ation. CM in
ation
(not shown) has a typical negative hump-shaped response since Price adjustments in the CM are subject to
the Calvo friction. The DM in
ation, on the other hand, reacts instantly to shocks and mimics very closely
the changes in the interest rate. We consider this to be evidence that DM prices are less sticky than CM
prices. Output and consumption in both markets show a hump-shaped response after the shock prolonged
by the expansionary policy of the central bank. Since the technology shock is transitory, CM and DM output
eventually return to their steady state levels.
Responses to technology shocks in DSGE models tend to be dicult to compare across studies because
they are sensitive to assumptions about shock persistence { random-walk versus stationary technology shock
{ and the central bank's reaction to output 
uctuation { reaction to output growth or to deviations of output
from a particular measure of potential output. Nonetheless, a comparison with Smets and Wouters (2003,
henceforth SW) is instructive. SW estimated a DSGE model with both Calvo price and wage stickiness using
a Euro Area data set that included linearly detrended output. They obtain an estimate of  of about 0.9
and an estimate of  of 0.48. According to their estimates (SW, Figure 3) the output response to a positive24
technology shock is hump shaped, with a peak after 5 quarters. Both in
ation and the interest rate fall,
reaching a trough after 3 periods and then slowly returning to their steady state values. Hours worked also
fall after a positive technology shock. We obtain very similar results. Due to the large price stickiness in the
CM, hours worked (not shown) fall after a positive technology shock. Thus, we conclude that the output and
price dynamics in the CM resemble those of other estimated New Keynesian models. Due to the presence of
the DM, in which prices are eectively 
exible, our response of aggregate in
ation is stronger than in SW,
essentially monotonic, and fairly short-lived.
The eect of a shock to preferences for the DM good is depicted in Figure 3. The responses resemble
those of a typical demand shock with a shift to the DM and an increase in the relative price of DM goods. On
impact DM output cannot change since money balances are pre-determined. Moreover, since money becomes
more valuable tomorrow (due to the persistence of the increase in ), DM prices decline on impact. In order
to nance higher DM consumption, households accumulate more money, which reduces CM consumption
and output initially. Once DM variables start to adjust in period 2, DM in
ation shoots up due to increased
demand, which triggers the central bank to increase interest rates and stabilize the economy after a few
oscillations due to overshooting in both directions. There is a long-lived response of output due almost
solely to the persistent increase in DM output.
Finally, responses to a contractionary short-run monetary policy shock are provided in Figure 4. Real
GDP and aggregate in
ation (at annualized rates) both drop approximately by 50 basis points. Compared
to the papers surveyed in Schorfheide (2009) this estimate of the relative output and in
ation response is
on the high side, albeit not unreasonably large. It indicates that the overall level of nominal rigidity in
the model economy, despite the fairly large  estimate for the CM, is small, as we explained above. The
rise in the nominal interest rate increases the opportunity costs of holding money and reduces the relative
demand for goods produced in the DM as evidenced by the drop in relative prices. After the initial impact,
the fall in output and in
ation prompts the central bank to lower the interest rate to essentially undo the
initial increase, which starts a recovery in both the CM and the DM. After a few oscilations due to the
large response of DM in
ation and output, the economy converges back to the steady state at a somewhat
sluggish pace. A discussion of dynamic responses to a change in the target in
ation rate is deferred to the
subsequent section.
Before we conclude the discussion of model dynamics, we want to provide some evidence about the lack
of persistence of DM in
ation, which was key in understanding why  is large. Using a simulation of our
model, we nd that the aggregate in
ation has an autocorrelation of between 0:34   0:53, which is broadly
in line with the data, as it should be. This can be decomposed into CM in
ation persistence of between
0:74   0:91 and DM in
ation persistence of around  0:10.25
3.7 Model Fit
In order to assess the t of the estimated search-based DSGE model, we will consider two reference models.
The rst reference model is a standard New Keynesian DSGE model in which real money balances directly
enter the utility function in an additively separable manner. We will refer to this model as the MIU model.
The second reference model is a restricted vector autoregression, in which the target in
ation rate evolves
exogenously. We consider various measures of relative t, including marginal log likelihood values, in-
sample root-mean-squared errors (RMSE), and discrepancies between the DSGE model and the VAR impulse
response functions.
MIU Model: We construct the MIU model by shutting down ( = 0) the decentralized market in the
search-theoretic models described in Section 2 and adding a real-money balance term to the households'
instantaneous utility function:












The shock t captures time-varying preferences for money and the parameter  controls the interest-rate
elasticity of money demand. The scaling by A=Z
1=(1 )
 can be interpreted as a re-parameterization of t,
which has the eect that steady state velocity stays constant as we change A and Z. To mimic the timing
conventions in the search-based models, we assume that mt is the (pre-determined) money stock at the
beginning of the period, and Pt is the price at which the nal good is sold in period t. For the common
parameters, we impose the same restrictions and use the same prior distributions as in the estimation of
SBM(B) and SBM(PT). In addition, we assume that the parameter  is a priori distributed according to a
gamma distribution with mean 20 and variance 5.12
VAR: We collect output, in
ation, interest rates, and inverse velocity in the 4  1 vector y1;t and the
target in
ation rate in the 1  1 vector y2;t. Moreover, we let yt = [y0
1;t;y2;t]0. We assume that yt follows a
Gaussian vector autoregressive law of motion subject to the restrictions that the target in
ation rate evolves
according to a random walk process and that the innovations to the target in
ation rate are orthogonal to
the remaining shocks. These restrictions are consistent with the assumptions that underlie our DSGE model
and identify the propagation of unanticipated changes in the target in
ation. The VAR takes the form
y1;t = 0 + 1yt 1 + ::: + 2yt p +  y2;t + u1;t (45)
y2;t = y2;t 1 + ;t; (46)
where u1;t  N(0;11) and is independent of ;t. We estimate the VAR composed of (45) and (46) with
12Large estimates of this parameter are common in the literature. Levin et al. (2006) report an estimate of 11.4 and
Christiano et al. (2005) report 10.6.26
p = 4 using a version of the \Minnesota" prior (see Doan, Litterman, and Sims (1984) and Sims and Zha
(1998)) described in Lubik and Schorfheide (2006).13
Log marginal data densities and in-sample RMSEs for SBM(B), SBM(PT), MIU, and the VAR are
reported in Table 5. If two models have equal prior probabilities, then dierences of log marginal data











where Y t collects y1;:::;yt 1 and Y 0 signies prior information, log marginal likelihoods can be interpreted
as pseudo-out-of-sample one-step-ahead predictive scores. Finally, the approximation
lnp(Y T) = ln
Z
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where ^ T is the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) and ^ HT is the Hessian evaluated at the MLE, highlights
that the log marginal data density adjusts the maximized log likelihood function by a penalty for model
complexity, namely, the log determinant of the Hessian.
According to the log marginal likelihoods, the bargaining version of the SBM is slightly preferred over
the price taking version. A comparison of the RMSEs suggests that the ranking is mainly due to dierences
in the RMSE for inverse velocity.14 The MIU model attains an even larger marginal likelihood value than
SBM(B). While the MIU's in-sample output predictions are slightly less precise, the in
ation, interest rate,
and velocity forecasts are more accurate than those of the search-based models.
The two main dierences between the MIU model and the SBMs are that, rst, the MIU model only
has one sticky-price sector whereas the SBMs are composed of a sticky price and a 
exible price sector that
are aggregated into GDP. Second, the MIU model has a separable structure that insulates the economy from
money demand shocks. We will focus on the latter aspect. The estimated value of  in the MIU model is
0.98 and most of the variation in real money is explained by the highly persistent money demand shock e t,
which has no eect on output, in
ation, and interest rates. Thus, the weak correlation between real money
13The Minnesota prior tilts the estimates of the VAR coecients toward univariate unit root representations. The hyperpa-
rameters are  = 0:1, d = 3:1, w = 5,  = 1,  = 1. Our prior assumes that the elements of 	 are independently distributed
according to N(0; 2).
14This and the subsequent statements relating marginal log likelihoods and RMSEs need to be taken with a grain of salt.
In a model with normally distributed shocks, lnp(Y Tj^ T) is approximately a function of the log determinant of the in-sample
one-step-ahead forecast error covariance matrix. This log determinant does not only depend of the diagonal elements of the
forecast error covariance matrix, but also on the o-diagonal elements.27
and the other variables in the data allows the money demand shock in the MIU model to capture real money
balance 
uctuations without compromising the t for any other variable. In contrast, aggregate output and
in
ation in the search-based models are not insulated from money demand shocks.15 The relative ranking
of the MIU model and the search-based models is consistent with Ireland's (2004) nding that when money
is included as observable, U.S. data tend to reject non-separabilities in a more general MIU model.
The vector autoregression removes the restrictions that the DSGE models place on the joint dynamics
of output, in
ation, interest rates, and velocity. As is common in marginal likelihood comparisons between
estimated DSGE models and VARs, the VAR dominates SBM(B), SBM(PT), and the MIU model by a fairly
large margin.
3.8 Money Demand
As discussed in detail in Schorfheide (2000), since the VAR attains a better time series t than the DSGE
models, we can use its implications with respect to the propagation of shocks as a benchmark to assess
the search-based models. In a typical VAR, identifying structural shocks require assumptions which may
not necessarily in line with the assumptions in a DSGE model. In our setup, since we use the same law of
motion for the in
ation target in both the VAR and the DSGE model and treat it as observable in our DSGE
model, the identication in the VAR t squarely with our assumptions in the DSGE model. Figure 5 depicts
impulse responses to a target in
ation shock that raises in
ation by about 20 basis points in the long run
computed from the VAR (dotted bands show 90% credible sets) and SBM(B)(solid lines show the posterior
mean). The DSGE model restrictions imply that the long-run responses of in
ation, nominal interest rates,
and target in
ation are identical. While the long-run responses of the VAR are unconstrained, the impulse
response bands for in
ation and interest rates are approximately consistent with a 20-basis-point increase
over long horizons.
The most striking discrepancy between VAR and our model responses arises for inverse velocity. Ac-
cording to the VAR, the initial response of inverse velocity is sluggish, but after 20 periods it has fallen 100
basis points below its mean value, whereas the model based responses are a magnitude smaller. The VAR
estimates indicate that the interest elasticity of money demand is much lower in the shortrun than in the
longrun. According to the posterior mean VAR responses interest rates increase 5 basis points in the rst
period and velocity drops roughly 10 basis points below its steady state value. After ve periods, the interest
rate is up 26 basis points and velocity is down 58 basis points. In the longrun, after 200 periods (not shown),
the interest rate has increased by 29 basis points, whereas velocity has fallen about 210 basis points.
15When we produce the ltered signals shutting down all shocks except for the money demand shocks (not shown), in
the MIU model output, in
ation and the interest rate are completely 
at while for our model there are small but non-trivial

uctuations.28
As we show below, this discrepancy between the DSGE model and the VAR can be explained by the
inability of our DSGE model to match both short- and long-run interest elasticities of money demand.
For the SBM(PT) it is fairly straightforward to derive the log-linear approximation to the money demand
function.16
f Mt+1   
R
(R   1) + 
e Rt + I Et[ e Xt+1] + I Et[e t+1] + I Et[e t+1] (47)
where f Mt+1 is the real money balance based on end-of-period t money holdings. The interest semi-elasticity
is given by R=(R  1+) which is a decreasing function of .17 According to our posterior estimates, the
interest semi-elasticity is about 3 in SBM(PT). If one interprets the ratio of inverse velocity and interest rate
response as interest semi-elasticity, then the short-run elasticity is about 2 and the long-run elasticity roughly
7. These gures are consistent with other numbers that have been reported in the literature. Goldfeld and
Sichel (1990) estimate the short-run interest semi-elasticity to be around one. Estimates of the long-run
semi-elasticity reported in Lucas (1988, 2000), Stock and Watson (1993), and Ball (2001) range from 5 to 11.
It is apparent from Equation (47) that short- and long-run elasticities in our DSGE models are essentially
identical. The likelihood-based estimation picks up the low short-run elasticity. In Figure 5, this is re
ected
in DSGE-model-based velocity responses that are small at all horizons.
Guerron-Quintana (2009) considers a New Keynesian DSGE model in which demand for money arises
because of the presence of reduced-form transaction costs. He assumes that in every period only a fraction
of households are able to re-optimize their money balances. This arguably ad-hoc mechanism generates
an initially sluggish response of velocity to interest rate movements and disentangles short- and long-run
interest semi-elasticities of money demand. GMM estimation of the model-implied money demand function
based on a sample from 1960 to 2005 yields a short-run elasticity of about one and a long-run elasticity of
approximately 13. Moreover, Guerron-Quintana (2009) provides some evidence that the two elasticities have
dropped to 0.4 and 5 after 1984.
Returning to our estimation, Figure 6 depicts the steady state relationship between log inverse velocity
and the target in
ation rate for SBM(B) and SBM(PT) at the posterior mean parameter estimates and
provides a scatter plot of U.S. data. According to our estimated search-based models, consistent with the
previously presented impulse response function evidence, changes in the target in
ation rate have a small
eect on inverse velocity. Note that at the steady state the nominal interest rate is given by R = =. This
shows that the elasticity of money demand with respect to the nominal interest rate and that with respect
to in
ation are identical since the interest rate can change only if there are changes in the in
ation target.
16The expression for SBM(PT) is approximate because I Et[e qt+1] enters with a coecient that is very close to zero but not
exactly zero. The same ideas will go through for the bargaining model.
17Note that for small interest rates, the elasticity with respect to the gross interest rate is equal to the semi-elasticity with
respect to the net interest rate.29
In order to capture the large negative relationship between interest rates and inverse velocity in the longrun
present in the data, we have to lower  from 0.31 to about 0.06, which raises the interest semi-elasticity from
3 to 13 in SBM(PT).18 That we need to lower  to increase the sensitivity of money demand to changes in
the interest rates is obvious from (47). To understand this better recall that the nominal return on a bond




+ (1   )]:
which depends on the realization of the idiosyncratic taste shock as well as the money demand shock. The
term t+1u0(qt+1) captures the marginal utility of consuming qt+1 units of the DM good, and cq captures
the marginal disutility of producing it. Thus, the smaller the probability of participating in the DM, the
more interest rate sensitive the return to holding money conditional on participating in the DM has to be
to equate the expected returns on bond and money holdings. Since in equilibrium the return to holding
money is (inversely) proportional to money balances, the interest rate elasticity of money demand has to be
decreasing in .
Choosing  to match the steady state relationship between interest rates and velocity (as a function of
the target in
ation rate) to the correlation observed in U.S. data ignores the fact that much of the variation
in the actual data is caused by other exogenous shocks. However, if we compare the implied posterior
predictive distributions for the correlation between velocity and interest rates conditional on only the target
in
ation shock, we nd that  = 0:06 yields a very good match between the VAR and DSGE model implied
predictive distributions.
To examine the eects of inducing a high long-run interest rate elasticity of money demand we re-
estimate SBM(B) and SBM(PT) subject to the restriction that  = 0:06. Only the estimates of parameters
that govern the dynamics of the money demand shock and the price rigidity in the CM are signicantly
aected by lowering . The estimated persistence of  drops slightly and the standard deviation  increases
dramatically because the velocity forecasts are deteriorating. The implied size of the decentralized market
shrinks from 20% to 4% of GDP which yields smaller estimates for  and . Less price rigidity in the CM is
needed to capture the same aggregate in
ation dynamics.
The log marginal data density for the two search-based models drops by more than 100 points (see
Table 5) and the in-sample RMSE of inverse velocity rises from 2.17 to 3.22 for SBM(B) and from 2.32
to 3.20 for SBM(PT). The RMSEs for output, in
ation, and interest rates do not change by the same
order of magnitude. Thus, imposing a low value of  in the search-based models leads to an unambiguous
deterioration of time series t. We should note that the estimated MIU model is also unable to match the
18The benchmark annual calibration in AWW, who use long-run observations including the interest elasticity of money
demand, uses  = 0:25. A quarterly calibration, which is comparable to our estimation, yields exactly  = 0:06.30
long-run interest elasticity of money demand. We also re-estimated the MIU model subject to the high
elasticity restriction  = 5:15, which implies an increase of the interest semi-elasticity from 2 to 12, and
found a similar deterioration in t as for SBM(B) and SBM(PT).
Going back to Figure 5, we also show the posterior mean impulse response to an in
ation target shock
from the restricted version of SBM(B) using dashed lines. For  = 0:06 the initial response of inverse velocity
is almost 100 basis points, which lies outside the VAR credible interval, while the unrestricted model captures
the small short-run response of inverse velocity. After 20 periods, inverse velocity is about 10 basis points
below its steady state level in the restricted model, which is still small but closer to the VAR credible interval.
The long-run response (not shown in the gure) is about  50 basis points, whereas the 90% VAR credible
interval ranges from  60 to  390 points. Thus, given the restrictions generated by the search-based DSGE
models, we can either match the short-run or the long-run interest rate elasticity of money demand, but not
both.
4 Policy Analysis
One of the advantages of having a structural model is the ability to conduct policy experiments. In our case,
having a deeply founded money demand motive enables us to juxtapose the frictions that it brings against
the (admittedly reduced-form) frictions that arise from the rms' problem. The particular policy experiment
we consider is one where we change the long-run in
ation target of the central bank,  and assess its eect
on welfare in a steady state in which the only sources of uncertainty are the realization of the Calvo shock
on the rm side and households' opportunity to engage in a bilateral exchange in the DM. All aggregate
shocks are set to zero and hence aggregate outcomes are non-stochastic. We hereby expect to capture the
most important rst-order eects. An extension of the welfare analysis to an environment with aggregate
uncertainty is left for future research.
4.1 Welfare Cost Channels
There are ve potential channels through which changes in the long-run in
ation target can aect welfare
in our model. First, in
ation acts as a tax on money holdings and this reduces welfare. In our model,
an increase in in
ation increases the opportunity cost of holding money, reduces real money balances and
reduces the equilibrium consumption in the DM, which will directly reduce welfare. In addition to this direct
channel, since capital is used as an input to DM production, the return to holding capital falls due to the
fall in DM consumption, leading to reduced investment in the CM. This will then reduce all real activity in
the CM, including consumption, further reducing welfare. This channel is present in virtually all monetary31
models and it underlies Friedman's prescription of a zero percent net nominal interest rate, which has come
to be known as the Friedman rule, as this eliminates the opportunity cost of holding money. We will label
this eect of a change in the long-run in
ation target on welfare the Friedman channel.
Unlike in cash-in-advance, MIU, or consumption transaction costs models, in our search-based environ-
ment the Friedman channel arises through the explicit modelling of bilateral exchanges. A traditional way to
think about the opportunity cost of holding money is the welfare triangle (the area under the money demand
curve), which was rst discussed by Bailey (1956) and subsequently by Lucas (2000). It can be shown that
in the absence of any other distortions, the welfare cost of in
ation can be very well approximated by (in
fact for some models exactly equal to) the area under the money demand curve between the two rates being
compared.19 Therefore, the shape of the steady state relationship between inverse velocity and interest rate
depicted in Figure 6 is key for determining the strength of the Friedman channel.
Second, our model has a nominal rigidity where some rms cannot optimally change their prices, which
creates a relative price distortion.20 This distortion is captured by the deviation of Dt in (35) from unity
which would move the economy inside the production possibilities frontier by eectively destroying some of






















which shows that for a given level of markup  and in
ation, this distortion is aected by the fraction of
rms that cannot adjust their price () and the fraction of the rms out of those that cannot adjust their
price that can still dynamically index their price to lagged in
ation (). In particular if either  = 0 or  = 1,
then D = 1, which means this distortion is shut down. Moreover, holding the other parameter constant,
an increase in  and a decrease in  makes this distortion more severe. Finally, holding the parameters
constant, the distortion becomes more severe as the steady state in
ation rate moves away from 0% (in both
directions), which in turn will reduce welfare. We will label this channel the relative-price distortion channel.
Third, monopolistic competition among intermediate good producers creates an additional distortion in
our model. This distortion is captured by a positive markup in the CM, given by  and by moving the real
wage rate away from the marginal product of labor, it can be thought of as creating a wedge similar to a
labor income tax. To see this, shutting down the second channel above by setting  = 0, the intratemporal
19Craig and Rocheteau (2008) show that in the basic Lagos-Wright model, in the absence of any holdup problems, the area
under the money demand curve very closely approximates the consumption-equivalent welfare measure we will also use. When
holdup problems are present, the area under the money demand curve underestimates the welfare loss.











where the left-hand side is the marginal rate of substitution between CM consumption and labor and  > 0
creates a wedge between this and the marginal rate of substitution.21 While it is not obvious from this
equation, as Wolman (2001) shows, this distortion is minimized at a slightly positive in
ation rate. We will
label this channel the markup channel and will refer to this and the previous channel collectively as the New
Keynesian channel. The price-taking version of our model will display only these three channels.
There are two more distortions in the bargaining version of our model which are explained in detail in
AWW. To summarize, the bilateral nature of trade and the fact that the surplus in a meeting is split by
the two parties in the DM create two holdup problems: the buyers do not bring in the optimal amount of
money (a money demand holdup problem) and the sellers do not bring in the optimal amount of capital (an
investment holdup problem). These holdup problems are aggravated as in
ation increases, since this further
reduces the payos in the DM by reducing q. We will collectively refer to these two sources of welfare loss
as the holdup problem channel.
Our discussion so far makes it clear that the Friedman channel and the New Keynesian channel have
dierent implications for welfare. The welfare loss of in
ation from the Friedman channel is minimized (in
fact eliminated) at the Friedman rule of zero percent net nominal interest rate (or an in
ation target for
the central bank equal to the minus the rate of time preference). On the other hand, the loss due to the
New Keynesian channel is minimized around a zero percent in
ation target. When both of these channels
are present, the in
ation rate that minimizes the overall distortions may be at either of the two extremes or
somewhere in between.
The key parameters that control the strength of the New Keynesian channel are  and . While the
importance of  is well recognized in the literature, the sensitivity of welfare analysis to  is less appreciated.
 and  control the shape of the New Keynesian Phillips curve and are identied from the output and
in
ation dynamics, where  in particular adjusts to capture the in
ation persistence. The strength of the
Friedman channel is mostly determined by the DM participation probability , which is identied from the
comovements of velocity and interest rates. As explained in the previous section, we will consider two sets
of estimates. One obtained from the likelihood-based estimation of the search-based DSGE models, and
the other one by matching the model's implied interest elasticity of money demand to estimates of long-run
elasticities and re-estimating the rest of the parameters.
21It is common to use a labor income subsidy to oset the eect of the positive markup. As Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007)
also note, we nd this arbitrary and refrain from doing so, especially given our objective of nding the net welfare eect of all
the distortions in our model.33
4.2 Welfare Calculations
Before we turn to the results, a brief discussion about how we compute the welfare loss is in order. In our
model, the reduced-form steady state welfare, or equivalently the social welfare function which places equal
weights on all households, up to a constant is given by
V () =  [u(q)   c(q;k;Z)] + U(x)   Ah (48)
We solve for the percentage change required in x and consumption in the DM (the q in u(q)) to make the
households indierent between two economies with dierent steady state in
ation rates. We use an annual
in
ation rate of 2:5% as a benchmark, which is the average in
ation rate at the end of our sample. Finally,






Y with simply a constant G obtained from the estimations to
prevent any welfare eects coming through this term.
Figure 7 plots the welfare cost of deviating from the benchmark target of 2:5% in
ation for the four
versions of the model we considered in the previous section using the posterior mean parameter estimates.
The versions dier on whether the holdup problems are present (B) or not (PT) and whether  was estimated
to capture the short-run interest elasticity of money demand (SR) or xed to capture the long-run interest
elasticity (LR). All versions show that some target in the interval between the Friedman rule and price
stability is strictly better than the benchmark target, with a gain between 0.2%-0.6% of consumption. This
is not surprising since all the channels we identied above agree that positive in
ation is not desirable. While
welfare costs are fairly steep to the right of 0%, they are quite 
at to the left of 0%. For some versions,
the welfare dierence between the Friedman rule and price stability is less than 0.05%. Thus, in this target
in
ation region the Friedman channel and the New Keynesian channel work in opposite directions and their
strengths are similar. This nding contrasts with the MIU version of the New Keynesian model discussed in
the previous section, where welfare loss is almost symmetric around 0% in
ation.
As we compare the four DSGE model versions, we need to account for several simultaneous changes.
First, as we replace bargaining by price-taking, the holdup problem channel disappears, which reduces
the desirability of the Friedman rule. Accordingly the welfare gain of moving to the Friedman rule is
lowered. Second, as we move from SR to LR versions two eects are present. As Figure 6 illustrates, the
money demand curve becomes steeper, which increases the area underneath in the region to the left of 0%
in
ation. This rotation strengthens the Friedman channel. However, after the model is re-estimated, the
estimates of  are only slightly lower, while the estimates of  drop signicantly. The reduced dynamic
indexation strengthens the New Keynesian channel substantially. As a result, the welfare cost curve for the
LR versions are lower (re
ecting the increased Friedman channel) and more convex (re
ecting the increased
New Keynesian channel).34
To isolate the eects of the holdup channel and the slope of the money demand curve from that of the
New Keynesian channel, Figure 8 plots welfare costs holding the New Keynesian channel xed at  = 0:81
and  = 0:09. Now it becomes clear that the Friedman channel is larger in the bargaining version than in
the price-taking version, and it becomes stronger as one increases the interest elasticity of money demand.
Therefore, returning to Figure 7, it seems that going from SR to LR, the New Keynesian channel increases in
strength compared to the Friedman channel. We deduce that except for the bargaining (SR) version, which
has a very sharp prediction about welfare, the welfare gains of reducing the target in
ation rate below 0%
are fairly insensitive to the actual value that is chosen.
4.3 Accounting for Uncertainty
The central question we want to address is nding the optimal in
ation target for the central bank in the
presence of all (or some) of the ve channels we discussed above. From Figure 7 we can see that for the
bargaining version (SR), the Friedman rule is the optimal policy, which means that the Friedman channel,
the desire to avoid the opportunity cost of holding money, together with the holdup problem channel is
signicantly bigger than the New Keynesian channel. In other versions of the model, the optimal in
ation
appears to be between the Friedman rule and price stability, but never very close to price stability.
The evidence from the analysis thus far and other related studies makes it clear that the answer to
this question crucially depends on the parameter choices, especially , , and . Our Bayesian framework is
perfectly suited to account for parameter (and model) uncertainty. A casual inspection of Table 2 indicates
that the degree of indexation  is the least precisely estimated among the three key parameters and this large
uncertainty about  is likely to translate into substantial uncertainty with respect to policy eects.
While we could convert the marginal data densities reported in Table 5 into posterior model probabilities
and average across models, we decided in view of the overall model misspecication concerns to report results
for each version separately. For each draw # from the posterior distribution of a particular DSGE model
specication we can compute the  that yields the largest welfare gain, which we denote as 
opt
 (#). Now
suppose we consider a particular target in
ation rate  . For each draw #, we can calculate a \regret," that
is, the dierential between the welfare gains attained with 
opt
 (#) and  , respectively. Figure 9 depicts the
posterior probability that this regret is less than 0.01% as a function of  .
Our results indicate that by and large the welfare dierences among in
ation targets between 0 and
 2:5% is fairly small. For example, if we consider a posterior probability of 0.5 as a threshold, the low-
regret in
ation targets range from  2% and  1% (SBM(B-LR)), Friedman rule and -1% (SBM(PT-SR)),
and  1:25% and  0:3% (SBM(PT-LR)), respectively. Thus, even the SBM(PT-LR), which has a strong
New Keynesian channel and no holdup problem channel, does not rule out in
ation targets less than  1%.35
The only specication that yields fairly sharp policy prescriptions is SBM(B-SR). It strongly favors in
ation
rates that are very close to the Friedman rule with rates above  2% receiving a posterior probability of less
than 0.05. We want to emphasize that this specication attains the highest marginal likelihood among the
four versions of the model we consider. This means that if we were to use the model weights implied by the
marginal log-likelihoods, this version would get virtually all the weight.
To summarize, a target in
ation rate of  1%, which is substantially lower than the 2% rate favored
by most in
ation targeting countries, works well in all of the search-based models we considered. Someone
who is willing to rely on the estimated posterior model weights, might want to lower that target in
ation
rate even further to realize all potential welfare gains. Our analysis has one important caveat. We do not
account for aggregate uncertainty. Since the Friedman channel favors near-zero nominal interest rates, the
stochastic analysis requires a careful treatment of the zero lower bound. We will leave such an analysis for
future work.
5 Conclusion
As an alternative to the commonly used cashless New Keynesian model, or its \cash-lled" MIU counterpart,
we have developed an estimable DSGE model in which the presence of a decentralized market creates an
incentive for households to hold money and money's role as a medium of exchange emerges endogenously.
The model specication is closely tied to the theoretical literature that is developing micro-founded models
of monetary exchange, in particular Lagos and Wright (2005), and Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2008). We
discipline our model by making fairly standard choices about utility and production functions dened over
consumption goods, instead of choosing arguably arbitrary functional forms for the utility derived from real
money balances or the cost of transactions.
Using postwar U.S. data on output, in
ation, interest rates, and (inverse) velocity, we estimate several
versions of our search-based DSGE model. Most important, we obtain estimates for the parameters that
determine the exchange in the decentralized market and the price rigidity in the centralized market. Thus,
the econometric analysis provides us with a measurement of the relative strength of the various channels
through which target in
ation rates aect welfare. We explore the steady state welfare implications of
our model, taking parameter uncertainty into account. Our ndings suggest that the regret of a central
bank (of not choosing the policy that is optimal under the \true" parameters) is fairly small in the region of
[ 2:5%;0%] in
ation. Moreover, considering uncertainty about the pricing mechanism in the DM, which has
implications about the presence of holdup problems, and whether to match the short- or long-run interest
elasticity of money demand, we nd that negative in
ation targets, especially those less than  1% are36
desirable. Thus, the standard prescription of a cashless New Keynesian model, 0% long-run in
ation, is
never optimal according to our model.
A caveat remains. Our quantitative result is certainly at odds with the general practice in central banks
around the world. We know of no central bank that either explicitly or implicitly follows a de
ationary policy
in the longrun. This suggests that the motives behind non-negative in
ation targets of central banks are not
explicit in our model or in many related models. Billi and Kahn (2008) list a number of reasons why a low but
positive level of in
ation may be useful. Among these are measurement errors { that observed in
ation may
not be an accurate assessment of actual in
ation { the eect of de
ation on debts, and downward nominal
wage rigidity, none of which is present in our model. Finally, an aspect of monetary policy that we have
not addressed is optimal short-run stabilization in the presence of a lower bound on nominal interest rates.
Another reason why central banks may prefer a positive long-run in
ation target is that otherwise aggregate
shocks may push the economy too close to the zero bound. We leave a formal analysis of stabilization policies
to future work.
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Table 1: Parameters Fixed During Estimation
Preference Parameter  1.00
Preference Parameter  1E-4
Depreciation Rate  .014
Fixed Costs F 0.00
Indexation  1.00
Steady State GDP Y 1.00
Steady State ln(H=Y) -3.35
Steady State Inv Velocity ln(M=Y) -0.38
Share of Government Spending g 1.20
Steady State Real Rate rA 2.50
Central Bank's Reaction to In
ation  1 1.70
Notes: We use the following transformations:  = 1=(1 + rA=400),  = 1 + A=400. The model is log-
linearized around A = 4:00.43
Table 2: Prior and Posterior Distributions
Prior Distributions Posterior Distributions
SBM(B) SBM(PT)
Name Domain Density Para (1) Para (2) Mean 90% Intv Mean 90% Intv
Households
 [0;1) Uniform 0.00 1.00 0.95 [0.95, 0.96]
2 [0;1) Beta 0.40 0.20 0.63 [0.56, 0.70] 0.59 [0.52, 0.66]
Firms
 [0;1) Beta 0.30 .025 0.32 [0.31, 0.34] 0.27 [0.26, 0.28]
 I R
+ Gamma 0.15 0.05 0.14 [0.12, 0.16] 0.19 [0.18, 0.21]
 [0;1) Beta 0.60 0.15 0.83 [0.79, 0.87] 0.84 [0.80, 0.88]
 [0;1) Beta 0.50 0.25 0.72 [0.54, 0.91] 0.57 [0.31, 0.82]
S00 I R
+ Gamma 5.00 2.50 4.89 [2.50, 7.36] 5.08 [2.42, 7.71]
Central Bank
 2 I R
+ Gamma 0.20 0.10 0.86 [0.64, 1.06] 0.83 [0.64, 1.02]
R [0;1) Beta 0.50 0.20 0.61 [0.56, 0.66] 0.60 [0.55, 0.65]
R I R
+ InvGamma 0.50 4.00 0.36 [0.31, 0.41] 0.37 [0.31, 0.42]
R;2 I R
+ InvGamma 1.00 4.00 0.85 [0.63, 1.07] 0.85 [0.62, 1.08]
~ 
A;0 I R Normal 0.00 2.00 0.05 [-3.21, 3.26] 0.02 [-3.22, 3.28]
 I R
+ InvGamma 0.05 4.00 0.05 [0.04, 0.05] 0.05 [0.04, 0.05]
Shocks
g [0;1) Beta 0.80 0.10 0.84 [0.81, 0.88] 0.87 [0.83, 0.90]
g I R
+ InvGamma 1.00 4.00 1.01 [0.90, 1.11] 1.06 [0.94, 1.16]
 [0;1) Beta 0.80 0.10 0.97 [0.97, 0.98] 0.96 [0.95, 0.97]
 I R
+ InvGamma 1.00 4.00 1.80 [1.63, 1.97] 1.88 [1.70, 2.05]
Z [0;1) Beta 0.80 0.10 0.83 [0.76, 0.90] 0.83 [0.77, 0.89]
Z I R
+ InvGamma 1.00 4.00 1.04 [0.90, 1.17] 1.06 [0.91, 1.21]
Notes: Para (1) and Para (2) list the means and the standard deviations for Beta, Gamma, and Normal distributions;
the upper and lower bound of the support for the Uniform distribution; s and  for the Inverse Gamma distribution,




Table 3: Posterior Steady States
SBM(B) SBM(PT)
Mean 90% Intv Mean 90% Intv
A 16.1 [15.5, 16.7] 24.3 [23.8, 24.8]
B 0.44 [0.41, 0.46] 0.65 [0.62, 0.68]
Z 4.10 [3.70, 4.47] 5.48 [5.05, 5.89]
I=Y 0.16 [0.15, 0.16] 0.16 [0.16, 0.17]
K=Y 11.1 [10.6, 11.6] 11.8 [11.3, 12.3]
WH=Y 0.60 [0.58, 0.61] 0.61 [0.60, 0.62]
Overall Markup 0.14 [0.13, 0.16] 0.16 [0.14, 0.17]
DM Share 0.21 [0.19, 0.24] 0.20 [0.18, 0.22]
DM Markup 0.17 [0.11, 0.24] 0.000
Notes: Aggregate output is normalized to Y = 1 in the two versions of the search-based DSGE model.45
Table 4: Posterior Variance Decomposition (Business Cycle Freq)
Shock SBM(B) SBM(PT)
Mean 90% Intv Mean 90% Intv
Output
Gov Spending 0.51 [0.43, 0.61] 0.53 [0.42, 0.60]
Money Demand 0.05 [0.03, 0.07] 0.06 [0.03, 0.09]
Monetary Policy 0.12 [0.07, 0.17] 0.12 [0.06, 0.18]
Technology 0.32 [0.23, 0.40] 0.29 [0.21, 0.38]
Target In
ation 0.01 [0.00, 0.01] 0.01 [0.00, 0.01]
In
ation
Gov Spending 0.18 [0.14, 0.23] 0.17 [0.13, 0.21]
Money Demand 0.01 [0.00, 0.01] 0.01 [0.00, 0.02]
Monetary Policy 0.23 [0.17, 0.28] 0.21 [0.15, 0.25]
Technology 0.50 [0.45, 0.58] 0.51 [0.45, 0.58]
Target In
ation 0.08 [0.05, 0.12] 0.10 [0.06, 0.13]
Inverse Velocity
Gov Spending 0.44 [0.38, 0.49] 0.46 [0.40, 0.52]
Money Demand 0.52 [0.46, 0.57] 0.50 [0.44, 0.55]
Monetary Policy 0.02 [0.02, 0.03] 0.03 [0.02, 0.03]
Technology 0.02 [0.01, 0.03] 0.01 [0.00, 0.02]
Target In
ation 0.00 [0.00, 0.00] 0.00 [0.00, 0.00]
Real Money Balances
Gov Spending 0.11 [0.07, 0.14] 0.12 [0.08, 0.16]
Money Demand 0.70 [0.65, 0.74] 0.69 [0.63, 0.73]
Monetary Policy 0.13 [0.09, 0.17] 0.13 [0.09, 0.16]
Technology 0.07 [0.05, 0.11] 0.06 [0.03, 0.10]
Target In
ation 0.00 [0.00, 0.00] 0.00 [0.00, 0.00]
Notes: Real money balances are measured in terms of the CM good.46
Figure 2: Impulse Responses to Technology Shock
Notes: Figure depicts pointwise posterior mean and 90% credible interval of impulse responses for SBM(B)
model. Responses of in
ation and fed funds rate are measured in percentage points and responses of real
output, real money balances, and relative prices are measured in percentage deviations from the steady state.47
Figure 3: Impulse Responses to DM Taste Shock
Notes: Figure depicts pointwise posterior mean and 90% credible interval of impulse responses for SBM(B)
model. Responses of in
ation and fed funds rate are measured in percentage points and responses of real
output, real money balances, and relative prices are measured in percentage deviations from the steady state.48
Figure 4: Impulse Responses to Monetary Policy (R;t) Shock
Notes: Figure depicts pointwise posterior mean and 90% credible interval of impulse responses for SBM(B)
model. Responses of in
ation and fed funds rate are measured in percentage points and responses of real
output, real money balances, and relative prices are measured in percentage deviations from the steady state.49
Table 5: Marginal Data Densities and RMSEs
In-Sample RMSE
Model lnp(Y T) Output In
ation Interest Inv. Velocity
SBM(B) -998.43 0.81 1.18 1.41 2.17
SBM(PT) -1,007.26 0.83 1.18 1.42 2.32
MIU -949.14 0.86 1.08 1.06 1.43
VAR(4) -924.14 0.85 0.96 0.87 1.31
SBM(B)  = 0:06 -1,126.00 0.83 1.08 1.15 3.22
SBM(PT)  = 0:06 -1,126.59 0.83 1.08 1.15 3.20
MIU  = 5:15 -1,092.52 0.86 1.09 1.07 2.39
Notes: The marginal data densities for all models are computed conditional on the four observations 1964:I
to 1964:IV that are used to initialize the lags of the VAR. The RMSEs are computed at the posterior mode
and measured as follows: output is in percentage deviations from the linear trend, inverse velocity is in
percentage deviations from the sample mean, in
ation and interest rates are in annualized percentages.50
Figure 5: Impulse Responses to Inflation Target (;t) Shock
Notes: Figure depicts pointwise posterior 90% credible interval of impulse responses for VAR (red, dashed)
and posterior mean responses for SBM(B):  estimated (blue, solid)  = 0:06 (green, dashed). Responses of
in
ation and fed funds rate are measured in annualized percentages and responses of real output and inverse
velocity are measured in percentage deviations from the steady state.51
Figure 6: Steady State Relationship Between Inverse Velocity and Inflation Target























































Notes: The dots correspond to in
ation and in
ation target pairs in our sample and the lines are obtained
from dierent versions of our model.52
Figure 7: Steady State Welfare Costs














































Notes: Welfare costs of deviating from a 2.5% target in terms of consumption. They are calculated at the
posterior mean parameter estimates of the four models. Negative numbers correspond to welfare gains.53
Figure 8: Steady State Welfare with Fixed New Keynesian Channel














































Notes: Figure depicts welfare costs xing the parameters of the New Keynesian channel at  = 0:81 and
 = 0:09.54
Figure 9: Optimal Long-run Inflation


































































































Notes: Figure depicts the posterior probability of the welfare dierence between a particular in
ation target
and the optimal one being less than 0:01%.A-1
A Solving the Search-Based Model
This Appendix provides detailed derivations of the equilibrium conditions presented in the main text.
A.1 The Households' Problem
Using t to denote the Lagrange multiplier for (2) and after eliminating h using (1), the FOC are

































assuming that an interior solution exists. Second, we have the following envelope conditions,
V CM








+ (1   )t
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t;b (^ mt;kt;it 1;bt;St) =
ARt 1
Wt
which show that V CM
t (:) is linear in ^ mt.















































































It remains to specify how the terms of trade (q;d) are determined, so that we can substitute for their
derivatives in (A.6) and (A.7) which we turn to next. We consider two alternatives: bilateral bargaining via
generalized Nash bargaining and price-taking.












s.t. d  mb:






c(q;ks;Z)u0(q) + (1   )cq(q;ks;Z)u(q)
u0(q) + (1   )cq(q;ks;Z)
:













while the other derivatives in (A.6) and (A.7) are 0. Now reintroducing the time subscripts and inserting


















determines the the marginal return of having capital in the DM when the household is a seller.
Price-Taking: Recall that V CM
m () = A
PW and does not depend on m. The rst-order conditions for buyer
and seller are
u0(q) = ~ pV CM
m (m   ~ pq;) + ~ p; cq() = ~ pV CM
m (m + ~ pq;);
where  here denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint ~ pq  m. Assuming that the
























@ks = ~ p
@q
@ks;A-3
while the other derivatives in (A.6) and (A.7) are 0. Finally, reintroducing time subscripts and using these












+ (1   )t   ck(qt;kt;Zt): (A.14)
We obtain the optimality conditions for the household under bargaining by simply substituting (A.8),
(A.9), (A.11) and (A.12) into the household's FOC. For the price-taking model we replace (A.11) and (A.12)
by (A.13) and (A.14).
A.2 Firms in the Centralized Market
The setup of the centralized market resembles that of a New Keynesian DSGE model. Production is carried
out by two types of rms in the CM: nal good producers combine dierentiated intermediate goods. In-
termediate goods producing rms hire labor and capital services from the households to produce the inputs
for the nal good producers. To introduce nominal rigidity we follow Calvo (1983) by assuming that only a
constant fraction of the intermediate goods producers is able to re-optimize prices.






Pt(i)Yt(i)di s.t. (24) (A.15)







A free entry condition ensures that prots are zero in equilibrium.
Intermediate Goods Producers: Cost minimization subject to (27) yields the conditions:
PtWt = t(i)Pt(i)(1   )ZtKt(i)Ht(i)  (A.17)
PtRk
t = t(i)Pt(i)ZtKt(i) 1Ht(i)1 ; (A.18)








If we integrate both sides of the equation with respect to di and dene Kt =
R
Kt(i)di and Ht =
R
Ht(i)di








Thus, the aggregate capital labor ratio is a linear function of the ratio of factor prices. Total variable cost

























t (i) = ZtKt(i)Ht(i)1  is the \variable" part of output Yt(i). The real marginal cost MCt is the
same for all rms and equal to:


























































































































































































































and the rst-order condition becomes
F
(1)
t = (1 + )F
(2)
t : (A.24)
We are considering only the symmetric equilibrium in which all rms that can readjust prices will choose
the same Po
t (i) and hence will drop the i index. Moreover, let po
t = Po
t =Pt and t = Pt=Pt 1. Then we canA-5





























































t = (1 + )F
(2)
t (A.27)









Its law of motion can be derived as follows:



















































Lagging Dt by one period yields
























































A.3 Aggregate Resource Constraint and National Accounting
To take the model to the data we will now construct a GDP de
ator and a measure of real output that
is consistent with this GDP de
ator. Following NIPA conventions, we use a Fisher price index. However,A-6
to simplify the analysis we replace time-varying nominal shares by steady state shares. The DM share of







































It can be veried that up to a rst-order approximation changes in real GDP evolve according to a
Fisher quantity index with xed (steady state) weights. Let X denote the steady state of a variable Xt and
~ Xt = lnXt=X. Log-linearizing and dierencing our expression for real output in terms of the CM good
yields
 ~ Yt = (1   s)~ Yt + s[ ~ Mt   ~ t]:
Here  denotes the temporal dierence operator. According to the denition of prices in the DM
~ DM
t =  ~ Mt   ~ qt:
Combining the two previous equations leads to:
 ~ Yt = (1   s)~ Yt + s[~ qt + ~ DM
t   ~ t]:
Thus,
 ~ YGDP
t =  ~ Yt + ~ t   (1   s)~ t   s~ DM
t = (1   s)~ Yt + s~ qt: (A.33)
Hence, the level of GDP in period t is given by
~ YGDP
t = (1   s)~ Yt + s~ qt + [ ~ YGDP
0   (1   s)~ Y0   s~ q0]:
Under the normalizations PGDP
0 = 1 and P0 = 1 we obtain
~ YGDP
0 = (1   s)~ Y0 + s(M0   0):
We can therefore further simplify our expression for GDP to
~ YGDP
t = (1   s)~ Yt + s~ qt + s( ~ M0   ~ 0   ~ q0): (A.34)A-7
A.4 Functional Forms








(q + )1    1 
1   
:
Moreover, we let f(e;k) = ek1 .
A.5 Equilibrium Conditions
We now summarize the equilibrium conditions for the search-based model. The timing is such that all t shocks
are realized at the beginning of t and  St = (Zt;gt;t) and Rt are observed.  St summarizes the exogenous
state variables. We dene St =
  St;Rt

which will be the aggregate state variables of the household's
problem. In the following denitions, we do not track ht (individual labor supply) and Bt (the bond supply
of the government). We also do not track nominal money balances but instead track Mt = Mt=Pt 1. Recall
that Mt is determined based on t   1 information and so is Mt. Finally, we use t  Pt=Pt 1 and do not
track the level of prices. Given exogenous states
 St
	1
t=0 ; a monetary equilibrium is dened as allocations
fqt;Xt;Ht;Kt;It;t;Yt;Mt;Ytg
1








t=0 such that :























































































































+ (1   )

(A.45)
Intermediate Goods Producing Firms' Problem: Intermediate goods rms choose their capital labor








Firms that are allowed to change prices are choosing a relative price po
t(i) (relative to the aggregate price
level) to maximize expected prots subject to the demand curve for their dierentiated product, taking the
aggregate price level Pt as well as the prices charged by other rms as given, which leads to


































































t = (1 + )F
(2)
t (A.50)
Final Good Producing Firms' Problem: Final goods producers take factor prices and output prices
as given and choose inputs Yt(i) and output Yt to maximize prots. Free entry ensures that nal good



































Market Clearing: The goods market in the CM clears:






Yt = Yt (A.54)A-9
GDP and GDP De
ator: Prices and in















According to our (approximate) Fisher index the GDP de




Real output in terms of the CM good and GDP are
















































For estimation purposes it is useful to parameterize the model in terms of Y, H, and M and solve the






























Y = Y   M=
 Y = YD



















































To determine q and K we solve the following equations jointly:







1 = (1 + Rk
















1 = (1 + Rk

































 = (1 + )F
(2)


















which lead to the conditions for po
 above. The term D measures the steady state price dispersion. The
larger =, that is, the faster the price of the non-adjusters is eroding in real terms, the bigger D. Finally,









In the subsequent presentation of the log-linearized equations we adopt the convention that we abbreviate
time t expectations of a t + 1 variable simply by a time t + 1 subscript, omitting the expectation operator.
Household's Problem: The optimality conditions for the household can be expressed as
~ Wt = 
 ~ Xt (A.63)













(1 + )S00 ~ t (A.65)
~ kt+1 = (1   )~ kt + ~ it (A.66)
~ t   
 ~ Xt = (1   )~ t+1   
(1    + Rk
) ~ Xt+1 + Rk
 ~ Rk
t+1 (A.67)
+(1   (1    + Rk
))~  t+1
~ Mt = ~ gt + ~ Wt + ~ t (A.68)
~ Rt =
R   1 + 
R







( ~ Xt   ~ Xt 1)   ~ t (A.70)
Equations (A.63) to (A.70) determine wages, CM consumption, investment, capital, the shadow price of
installed capital, the rental rate of capital, real money balances, the stochastic discount factor used in theA-12
rms' problem, and DM consumption. For the price-taking version, we replace (A.67), (A.68) and (A.69)
with
~ t   
 ~ Xt = (1   )~ t+1   
(1    + Rk
) ~ Xt+1 + Rk
 ~ Rk
t+1 (A.71)
+(1   (1    + Rk
))~ ck;t+1
~ Mt = ~ qt + ~ cq;t + ~ Wt + ~ t (A.72)
~ Rt =
R   1 + 
R




Decentralized Market: We now determine the law of motion for ~ gq;t, ~  t, and ~ gt. In addition, we are
introducing some auxiliary variables. We begin with (omitting t subscripts),
u =
(q + )1    1 
1   
u0 = (q + ) 
u00 =  (q + )  1
c = expf  ~ Zgq k1  
cq =   expf  ~ Zgq  1k1  
ck = (1    )expf  ~ Zgq k  
cqq =  (    1)expf  ~ Zgq  2k1  
ckk =  (    1)expf  ~ Zgq k   1
cqk =  (1    )expf  ~ Zgq  1k  
which can be log-linearized as follows
~ uu =
q
(q + ) ~ q








~ c =    ~ Z +  ~ q + (1    )~ k
~ cq =    ~ Z + (    1)~ q + (1    )~ k
~ ck =    ~ Z +  ~ q    ~ k
~ cqq =    ~ Z + (    2)~ q + (1    )~ k
~ ckk =    ~ Z +  ~ q   (1 +  )~ k





which implies that ~  t evolves according to
~ gq;t + ~  t =
ckgq
ckgq   cqgk
[~ ck;t + ~ gq;t]  
cqgk
ckgq   cqgk
[~ cq;t + ~ gk;t]: (A.74)
Now consider the equation
gt(u0
t + (1   )cq;t) = ctu0
t + (1   )cq;tut;
which can be written in log-linear form as
[u0
 + (1   )cq]g~ gt
= u0
 (c   g) ~ u0
t + (1   )cqu~ ut + (1   )cq (u   g)~ cq;t (A.75)
+cu0
~ c + [ gu0
 + cu0
 + (1   )cqu] ~ t (A.76)
and determines ~ gt. Now consider
gq =
u0cq[u0 + (1   )cq] + (1   )(u   c)(u0cqq   cqu00)
[u0 + (1   )cq]2
In log-linear form, the equation can be rewritten as
gq [u0
 + (1   )cq]
2 ~ gq;t
=  gq [u0
 + (1   )cq][u0
 (~ ut + ~ t) + (1   )cq~ cq;t] (A.77)
+u0
cq [u0
 + (1   )cq](~ u0
t + ~ t + ~ cq;t)
+(u0
)
2 cq (~ u0
t + ~ t) +  (1   )u0
c2
q~ cq;t




u (~ ut + ~ t)   c ~ c;t

+(1   ) (u   c)u0
cqq (~ u0
t + ~ t + ~ cqq;tt)
 (1   ) (u   c)u00
cq (~ u00
t + ~ t + ~ cq;t):
Moreover,
gk =
u0ck [u0 + (1   )cq] + (1   )(u   c)u0cqk
[u0 + (1   )cq]
2 ;
which leads to an equation for ~ gk;t:
gk[u0
 + (1   )cq]2~ gk;t
=  2gk[u0
 + (1   )cq]

u0





 + (1   )cq](~ u0
t + ~ t + ~ ck;t)
+(u0
)
2 ck (~ u0
t + ~ t) + (1   )u0
ckcq~ cq;t
+(1   ) (u   c)u0
cqk (~ u0
t + ~ t + ~ cqk;t)
+(1   )u0
cqk [u (~ ut + ~ t)   c~ ct]:A-14
To summarize, Equations (A.74) to (A.78) determine ~  t, ~ gt, ~ gq;t, and ~ gk;t. The rst three variables appear
in the characterization of the households' problem above.
Firms' Problems: Marginal costs evolve according to
~ MCt = (1   ) ~ wt +  ~ Rk
t   ~ Zt:: (A.79)
Conditional on capital and factor prices, the labor demand is determined according to
~ Ht = ~ Kt + ~ Rk





t are proportional, ~ F
(1)
t = ~ F
(2)
t = ~ Ft. The remaining optimality conditions can be written
as follows.



















































































The relationship between the optimal price charged by the adjusting rms and the in
ation rate is given by
~ po










Equations (A.81) to (A.83) determine ~ t, ~ Ft, and ~ o
t.
Resource Constraint, Market Clearing Conditions in the CM: Aggregate output across intermediate
good rms evolves according to
~ _ Yt = ~ Yt + ~ Dt = (1 + F= _ Y)[ ~ Zt +  ~ Kt + (1   ) ~ Ht]: (A.84)
and the steady state price dispersion follows









































Aggregate Output and Prices, Measured Real Money Balances In log-linear terms, in
ation in the
DM evolves according to
~ DM
t = ~ Mt   ~ Mt 1   (~ qt   ~ qt 1) + ~ t 1: (A.87)
Since all in
ation rates share the same steady state, changes in the GDP de
ator are given by
~ GDP
t = (1   s)~ t + s~ DM
t : (A.88)
Real output in terms of the CM nal good evolves according to
~ Yt = (1   s)~ Yt + s( ~ Mt   ~ t): (A.89)
As we showed in the main text, real GDP can be expressed as
~ YGDP
t = (1   s)~ Yt + s~ qt + s( ~ M0   ~ 0   ~ q0): (A.90)
Finally, inverse velocity evolves according to
^ Mt+1=Yt = ~ Mt+1   ~ Yt: (A.91)
Monetary Policy: The monetary policy rule can be written as
~ Rt = R ~ Rt 1 + (1   R)[ 1(~ GDP
t   ~ 
t) +  2( ~ YGDP
t   ~ YGDP
t 1 )] + R;t: (A.92)
B The MIU Model






























































































As in the search-based model, we dene Mt+1 = Mt+1=Pt.
Intermediate Goods Producing Firms' Problem: Intermediate goods rms choose their capital labor








Firms that are allowed to change prices are choosing a relative price po
t(i) (relative to the aggregate price
level) to maximize expected prots subject to the demand curve for their dierentiated product, taking the
aggregate price level Pt as well as the prices charged by other rms as given, which leads to


































































t = (1 + )F
(2)
t (A.104)
Final Good Producing Firms' Problem: Final goods producers take factor prices and output prices
as given and choose inputs Yt(i) and output Yt to maximize prots. Free entry ensures that nal good



































The gross domestic product of this economy is given by Yt = Yt.
Market Clearing: The goods market in the CM clears:






Yt = Yt (A.108)

















For estimation purposes it is useful to parameterize the model in terms of Y = Y, H, and M and solve


































 Y = YD



















































We will frequently use equation-specic constants, such as A and B. Variables dated t + 1 refer to time t
conditional expectations.A-19







 ~ Xt =  









(1 + )S00 ~ t (A.112)
~ kt+1 = (1   )~ kt + ~ it (A.113)
~ t   
 ~ Xt = (1   )~ t+1   
 ~ Xt+1 + Rk
 ~ Rk
t+1 (A.114)
m ~ Mt+1 = 







( ~ Xt   ~ Xt 1)   ~ t: (A.116)
Equations (A.110) to (A.116) determine wages, consumption, investment, capital, the shadow value of in-
stalled capital, the rental rate of capital, real money balances, and the stochastic discount factor.
Firms' Problems: Marginal costs evolve according to
~ MCt = (1   ) ~ wt +  ~ Rk
t   ~ Zt: (A.117)
Conditional on capital, the labor demand is determined according to
~ Ht = ~ Kt + ~ Rk





t are proportional, ~ F
(1)
t = ~ F
(2)
t = ~ Ft. The remaining optimality conditions can be written
as follows.



















































































The relationship between the optimal price charged by the adjusting rms and the in
ation rate is given by
~ po










Equations (A.119) to (A.121) determine ~ t, ~ Ft, and ~ po
t.
Resource Constraint, Market Clearing Conditions: Aggregate output across evolves according to
~  Yt = ~ Yt + ~ Dt = (1 + F= Y)[ ~ Zt +  ~ Kt + (1   ) ~ Ht]: (A.122)
and the steady state price dispersion follows




























~ It + ~ gt: (A.124)
Monetary Policy: The monetary policy rule can be written as
~ Rt = R ~ Rt 1 + (1   R)[ 1(~ t   ~ 
t) +  2(~ Yt   ~ Yt 1)] + R;t: (A.125)A-21
C Supplemental Tables and Figures
Table A-1: compares unrestricted and restricted ( = 0:06) parameter estimates for the SBM(B) model.
Table A-2: compares unrestricted and restricted ( = 0:06) parameter estimates for the SBM(PT) model.
Table A-2: compares unrestricted and restricted ( = 5:17) parameter estimates for the MIU.
Table A-4: compares posterior means of DSGE model implied steady states.
Table A-5: compares variance decompositions from MIU and SBM(B).
Table A-6: conditional on the posterior mean parameter estimates, we simulate a sample of 10,000 observa-
tions and report in
ation standard deviations and rst-order autocorrelations. While the autocorrelation of
CM in
ation is around 0.9, the autocorrelation of DM in
ation is slightly negative. As a consequence, the
autocorrelation of GDP de
ator in
ation is between 0.35 to 0.5, which is smaller than in the estimated MIU
model.
Table A-7: we construct a posterior predictive distribution for the correlation between interest rates and
inverse velocity conditional on the target in
ation shock. It is only if we x  and  in the DSGE models to
values that imply large interest rate elasticities of money demand that the DSGE model implied posterior
predictive distribution matches that implied by the VAR.
Figure A-1: The top panel depicts the welfare gain of reducing the target in
ation rate below 2.5%. In the
bottom panel we report the posterior expected probability that the regret of choosing a particular target
in
ation rate is more than 0.01%. For the estimated value of  welfare is maximized at 0% in
ation, which
is the prediction of a cashless DSGE model. If  is choosen to match the long-run interest rate elasticity,
the optimal target in
ation rate is around -1%.A-22
Table A-1: Posterior Distributions: Unrestricted versus Restricted SBM(B)
SBM(B)  estim. SBM(B)  = 0:06
Name Mean 90% Intv Mean 90% Intv
Household
 0.95 [0.95, 0.96] 0.96 [0.95, 0.97]
~  0.63 [0.56, 0.70] 0.13 [0.13, 0.13]
Firms
 0.32 [0.31, 0.34] 0.29 [0.28, 0.30]
 0.14 [0.12, 0.16] 0.16 [0.15, 0.18]
 0.83 [0.79, 0.87] 0.79 [0.75, 0.83]
 0.72 [0.54, 0.91] 0.14 [0.00, 0.28]
S00 4.89 [2.50, 7.36] 5.40 [3.05, 8.02]
Central Bank
 2 0.86 [0.64, 1.06] 0.87 [0.71, 1.03]
R 0.61 [0.56, 0.66] 0.65 [0.61, 0.70]
R 0.36 [0.31, 0.41] 0.33 [0.28, 0.37]
R;2 0.85 [0.63, 1.07] 0.78 [0.58, 0.98]
~ 
0;A 0.05 [-3.21, 3.26] -0.68 [-3.57, 2.75]
 0.05 [0.04, 0.05] 0.05 [0.04, 0.05]
Shocks
g 0.84 [0.81, 0.88] 0.87 [0.83, 0.90]
g 1.01 [0.90, 1.11] 1.09 [0.96, 1.21]
 0.97 [0.97, 0.98] 0.91 [0.88, 0.95]
 1.80 [1.63, 1.97] 4.08 [3.67, 4.51]
z 0.83 [0.76, 0.90] 0.77 [0.70, 0.84]
z 1.04 [0.90, 1.17] 1.89 [1.40, 2.40]A-23
Table A-2: Posterior Distributions: Unrestricted versus Restricted SBM(PT)
SBM(PT)  estim. SBM(PT)  = 0:06
Name Mean 90% Intv Mean 90% Intv
Household
 0.00 [0.00, 0.00] 0.00 [0.00, 0.00]
~  0.59 [0.52, 0.66] 0.13 [0.13, 0.13]
Firms
 0.27 [0.26, 0.28] 0.28 [0.27, 0.29]
 0.19 [0.18, 0.21] 0.17 [0.16, 0.19]
 0.84 [0.80, 0.88] 0.80 [0.75, 0.86]
 0.57 [0.31, 0.82] 0.20 [0.00, 0.41]
S00 5.08 [2.42, 7.71] 5.48 [2.71, 8.11]
Central Bank
 2 0.83 [0.64, 1.02] 0.88 [0.69, 1.06]
R 0.60 [0.55, 0.65] 0.65 [0.61, 0.70]
R 0.37 [0.31, 0.42] 0.33 [0.29, 0.38]
R;2 0.85 [0.62, 1.08] 0.80 [0.58, 1.01]
~ 
0;A 0.02 [-3.22, 3.28] 0.01 [-3.40, 3.33]
 0.05 [0.04, 0.05] 0.05 [0.04, 0.05]
Shocks
g 0.87 [0.83, 0.90] 0.87 [0.83, 0.90]
g 1.06 [0.94, 1.16] 1.09 [0.96, 1.21]
 0.96 [0.95, 0.97] 0.91 [0.88, 0.94]
 1.88 [1.70, 2.05] 4.11 [3.67, 4.53]
z 0.83 [0.77, 0.89] 0.75 [0.67, 0.83]
z 1.06 [0.91, 1.21] 2.13 [1.38, 2.88]A-24
Table A-3: Posterior Distributions: Unrestricted versus Restricted MIU
MIU  estim. MIU  = 5:17
Name Mean 90% Intv Mean 90% Intv
Households
 31.754 [24.764, 38.079] 5.167 [5.167, 5.167]
Firms
 0.282 [0.271, 0.293] 0.282 [0.271, 0.292]
 0.165 [0.151, 0.179] 0.165 [0.151, 0.178]
 0.756 [0.728, 0.784] 0.750 [0.719, 0.785]
 0.036 [0.000, 0.073] 0.039 [0.000, 0.079]
S00 5.285 [2.640, 7.963] 4.988 [2.460, 7.468]
Central Bank
 2 1.027 [0.846, 1.224] 1.024 [0.836, 1.209]
R 0.669 [0.622, 0.719] 0.658 [0.606, 0.710]
R 0.338 [0.284, 0.389] 0.346 [0.290, 0.403]
R;2 0.810 [0.572, 1.020] 0.830 [0.591, 1.052]
~ 
0;A -0.058 [-3.439, 3.126] 0.033 [-3.262, 3.461]
 0.049 [0.044, 0.053] 0.049 [0.044, 0.053]
Shocks
g 0.896 [0.865, 0.931] 0.884 [0.847, 0.923]
g 1.140 [0.989, 1.299] 1.095 [0.938, 1.239]
 0.982 [0.974, 0.991] 0.954 [0.929, 0.979]
 1.298 [1.170, 1.415] 3.279 [2.985, 3.611]
z 0.799 [0.719, 0.887] 0.823 [0.745, 0.904]
Z 2.082 [1.451, 2.696] 1.927 [1.293, 2.576]A-25
Table A-4: Steady States (Posterior Means)
SBM(B) SBM(PT) MIU
 estim.  = 0:06  estim.  = 0:06  estim.  = 5:17
A 16.1 14.6 24.3 20.6 18.6 40.0
B 0.44 0.52 0.65 0.73 0.70 1.48
Z 4.10 5.32 5.48 5.56 5.54 5.54
I=Y 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17
K=Y 11.1 11.7 11.8 11.9 12.0 12.0
WH=Y 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.62
Overall Markup 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17
DM Share 0.21 0.04 0.20 0.04
DM Markup 0.17 0.12 0.000
Notes: Aggregate output is normalized to Y = 1 in all economies.A-26
Table A-5: Posterior Variance Decomposition (Business Cycle Freq)
Shock SBM(B) MIU
Mean 90% Intv Mean 90% Intv
Output
Gov Spending 0.51 [0.43, 0.61] 0.43 [0.35, 0.50]
Money Demand 0.05 [0.03, 0.07] 0.00 [0.00, 0.00]
Monetary Policy 0.12 [0.07, 0.17] 0.16 [0.11, 0.22]
Technology 0.32 [0.23, 0.40] 0.40 [0.33, 0.52]
Target In
ation 0.01 [0.00, 0.01] 0.01 [0.01, 0.02]
In
ation
Gov Spending 0.18 [0.14, 0.23] 0.05 [0.03, 0.06]
Money Demand 0.01 [0.00, 0.01] 0.00 [0.00, 0.00]
Monetary Policy 0.23 [0.17, 0.28] 0.13 [0.09, 0.17]
Technology 0.50 [0.45, 0.58] 0.71 [0.67, 0.77]
Target In
ation 0.08 [0.05, 0.12] 0.11 [0.07, 0.13]
Inverse Velocity
Gov Spending 0.44 [0.38, 0.49] 0.34 [0.28, 0.40]
Money Demand 0.52 [0.46, 0.57] 0.52 [0.47, 0.58]
Monetary Policy 0.02 [0.02, 0.03] 0.02 [0.01, 0.03]
Technology 0.02 [0.01, 0.03] 0.11 [0.08, 0.17]
Target In
ation 0.00 [0.00, 0.00] 0.01 [0.00, 0.01]
Real Money Balances
Gov Spending 0.11 [0.07, 0.14] 0.07 [0.04, 0.10]
Money Demand 0.70 [0.65, 0.74] 0.89 [0.84, 0.92]
Monetary Policy 0.13 [0.09, 0.17] 0.03 [0.02, 0.04]
Technology 0.07 [0.05, 0.11] 0.01 [0.00, 0.02]
Target In
ation 0.00 [0.00, 0.00] 0.00 [0.00, 0.01]
Notes: Real money balances are measured in terms of the CM good.A-27
Table A-6: Inflation Volatility and Persistence
Model Std Dev AC(1)
~ GDP ~ CM ~ DM ~ GDP ~ CM ~ DM
SBM(B)  estimated 1.54 1.13 5.13 0.34 0.91 -0.11
SBM(B)  = 0:06 1.39 1.20 10.5 0.53 0.74 -0.17
SBM(PT)  estimated 1.43 1.04 5.26 0.40 0.90 -0.06
SBM(PT)  = 0:06 1.35 1.16 11.2 0.51 0.75 -0.18
MIU  estimated 1.70 0.80
MIU  = 5:17 1.64 0.78
Notes: Sample moments are computed based on simulated time series of 10,000 observation, conditional on
posterior mean estimate. The target in
ation shock is set to zero. AC(1) is the rst-order autocorrelation.A-28
Table A-7: Sample Moments Conditional on Target Inflation Shocks
StD(Interest) STD(Inv.Veloc.) Corr(Interest, Inv.Veloc.)
Mean 90% Intv Mean 90% Intv Mean 90% Intv
SBM(B)  estimated 1.18 [0.53, 1.97] .003 [.001, 005] -0.44 [-0.99, 0.45]
SBM(B)  = 0:06 1.20 [0.59, 1.85] 0.02 [0.01, 0.04] -0.90 [-0.99, -0.80]
SBM(PT)  estimated 1.19 [0.52, 2.11] .003 [.001, 005] -0.28 [-0.97, 0.54]
SBM(PT)  = 0:06 1.18 [0.51, 1.91] 0.02 [0.01, 0.04] -0.91 [-0.99, -0.81]
MIU  estimated 1.21 [0.55, 1.87] 0.01 [.004, 0.02] 0.54 [0.09, 0.94]
MIU  = 5:17 1.20 [0.55, 1.89] 0.03 [0.01, 0.04] -0.96 [-0.99, -0.92]
VAR(4) 0.39 [0.10, 0.71] 0.01 [.002, 0.03] -0.88 [-0.99, -0.93]
Notes: For the three models we report means and 90% credible intervals of the predictive distribution of
sample moments (computed from 200 articial observations) conditional on the target in
ation shock ;t.A-29
Figure A-1: Welfare Implications of Estimated MIU Model






































) Welfare Cost of Deviating from 2.5% Inflation Target
MIU(SR)
MIU(LR)



















Posterior Probability of Regret Less than 0.01%
Notes: The top panel depicts the welfare gain of reducing the target in
ation rate below 2.5%. MIU(SR)
refers to the unrestricted version and MIU(LR) refers to the version in which we restrict  = 5:17. In the
bottom panel we report the posterior expected probability that the regret of choosing a particular target
in
ation rate is more than 0.01%.